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1 Introduction 
A universal prediction of the various oligopoly models used to predict and explain behaviour in 
the England and Wales (E&W) electricity wholesale market is that divestiture of plants by the 
two large incumbent generators and new entry should have led to lower prices and mark-ups.  
However, even though the market has become significantly less concentrated over the 1990s 
through both of these mechanisms the regulator (OFGEM, formerly OFFER) has continued to 
complain about high prices and generator manipulation of prices.  This led to OFGEM taking two 
generators (AES and British Energy) to the Competition Commission in a (failed) attempt to have 
market abuse conditions inserted in their licences, and has led to the Pool being replaced by a new 
set of arrangements (NETA) in Spring 2001.  These new arrangements are controversial (see 
Sweeting (2000) for a discussion), and their success is likely to be partly determined by how 
much market power the generators still have.  This paper gathers evidence on what happened to 
prices and mark-ups during the last five years of the Pool, which have been studied relatively 
little compared to the first five years, and also seeks to make several more original contributions.   
First, I try to identify which generators have been involved in supporting high prices, and to look 
at whether the owners of divested plants appear to bid in a significantly different manner to the 
incumbents, National Power (NP) and PowerGen (PG).  An important part of this analysis looks 
at whether the way divestiture was carried out had a significant effect on outcomes.  In particular, 
the first major divestiture of coal plants, to Eastern, was completed via a leasing arrangement 
under which Eastern paid the former owners of the plants a £6/MWh fee whenever it produced.  
This would have raised Eastern’s marginal cost and the effects of this fee do seem to appear in the 
data.  The second set of divestitures also involved Edison First Mission (EFM) buying two coal 
stations from PG.  EFM already owned E&W’s pumped storage plants that frequently set prices 
in the higher demand periods of each day.  Although the data suggests that over time the pumped 
storage units have been bid at higher prices since 1995, there is no clear additional effect on their 
bids when EFM purchased its coal stations. 
Second, I examine in detail whether there is any evidence that availability is used strategically in 
the fashion suggested by Patrick and Wolak (1997).  They argue that by declaring plant 
unavailable during the day generators can raise significantly prices above the industry’s true 
marginal cost even though the units may only be bid at cost.  I find that inframarginal plant is 
very rarely declared unavailable during the bidding day, which works against Patrick and 
Wolak’s theory.  I also find that overall levels of availability are generally higher – and close to 
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or above the US standard used for comparison by Patrick and Wolak – than their paper suggested.  
It is true that availability tends to be lower during the summer, but this is consistent with efficient 
operation as in England and Wales the summer is the low demand period (see Figure 1) and the 
system as a whole has a significant surplus capacity (in comparison to markets such as 
California).  Of course, this does not mean that availability is never used strategically, but my 
results suggest that its use is not systematic in the way suggested by Patrick and Wolak.2 
Third, I try to assess whether developments in the market have led to a decline in productive 
efficiency.  Simple Cournot models suggest that the creation of asymmetric competitors, or some 
generators bidding competitively as price takers, may decrease productive efficiency.  In the 
context of mergers, this point was analysed in Farrell and Shapiro (1990).  The £6/MWh fee may 
either increase or decrease productive efficiency, acting as an efficiency-enhancing tax on a 
relatively small generator at peak demand but also inefficiently removing some capacity from the 
market when demand and prices are low.  My initial calculations, using only coal plants and 
taking plant availability as given, indicate that there has been a decline in productive efficiency 
following the first round of divestiture in 1996, amounting to around 1% of coal production costs.  
This is reasonably large in relation to the gains from privatization and restructuring estimated by 
Newbery and Pollitt (1997) of around 5% of production costs, although it is possible that 
competition has encouraged other cost savings.  Losses of productive efficiency are clearly a 
concern when divestiture and increased entry have failed to reduce prices. 
The main conclusions from the empirical analysis are that divestiture and entry did not reduce 
prices or mark-ups, even though concentration both in overall generation and in price-setting fell 
markedly from 1995 to 2000.  There is some evidence that the £6/MWh fee may have contributed 
to higher prices, by increasing Eastern’s bids and reducing competition in those low demand 
periods that have prices below Eastern’s inflated marginal costs.  The failure of prices to fall 
could be explained either by prices already being close to competitive levels (at least on average) 
or by generators being able to maintain equilibria above competitive levels even when 
concentration falls.  The former is possible if my measure of marginal cost systematically 
understates cost, while the latter would be consistent with the level of prices prior to 1995 being 
determined by factors that were not changed by divestiture. Two possibilities from the existing 
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 OFGEM has claimed to find several cases of capacity decisions taken to affect prices, which include an 
element of capacity payments. See for example, OFGEM’s Second Submission to the Competition 
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decisions, permanently withdrawing capacity from the market to increase prices.  I do not try to determine 
whether this is the case. 
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literature (see for example Wolfram (1999)) are implicit regulation (prices kept low to deter 
regulatory intervention) or limit pricing to prevent entry.  Given the extent of actual entry and the 
failure of prices to fall as the capital costs of new CCGT plants have fallen, the former 
explanation seems to me to be more plausible.  Indeed insofar as regulation of many generators 
may be harder than the regulation of just two, implicit regulation provides a potential explanation 
for why prices have not fallen since 1995 as fuel costs have declined.  If average prices are in fact 
determined by the level of regulatory pressure, and so do not send efficient signals to customers 
or potential entrants, there is even more reason to be concerned if divestiture has reduced system 
efficiency as my results suggest.    
This paper may be of interest to those thinking about divestiture in other electricity markets and 
in regulated markets more generally.  Existing empirical studies on divestiture focus primarily on 
what happens to productive efficiency (for example, Olley and Pakes’s (1996) study of the 
telecommunications equipment industry), or on the consequences of vertical divestiture (for 
example, Slade’s (1998) study of the UK beer industry following the Beer Orders).  This study 
examines a simple case of horizontal divestiture.  The results suggest that it is important to think 
about how divestiture is implemented and to take into account productive efficiency.  The fact 
that prices do not decline when concentration falls, as simple oligopoly models would predict, 
suggests that we may need to reassess how these models are applied to this kind of market.  For 
example, if there are in fact multiple equilibria, we need to understand far better than we do at the 
moment what drives the actual choice of equilibrium.  
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief guide to the operation of the market 
and the history of entry and divestiture.  Section 3 presents conclusions from the models that have 
been used to analyse the Pool, and also estimates a simple parameterized Cournot model to 
predict the effect of the £6/MWh fee and the divestiture of plant to EFM on prices at the daily 
peak.  Section 4 presents the evidence, based on a large dataset containing generator’s bids and 
availability, as well as prices.  Section 5 concludes and discusses implications of my findings. 
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2 A Brief Guide to the E&W Electricity Wholesale Market 
2.1 Operation3 
The Pool operates as a daily first price multi-unit procurement auction. At 10am each day 
generators, and a few small demand side bidders (ignored from this point on), present bids for 
each generating unit (there are 300 units, in around 100 different power plants) to supply power 
for the next day, along with a schedule which says at what times of the day units are available. 
Each bid has several components that are combined by the system operator (the SO, NGC) to 
give a single price for each unit (known as the Table A Bid Price). These are used to rank units by 
cost into the "merit order". The SO then uses half-hourly demand estimates (price inelastic by the 
Pool's rules), to find the available marginal unit in a particular half-hour. This unit's Table A Bid 
Price then determines the System Marginal Price (SMP) for that half-hour. Demand variation 
leads to SMP rising and falling during the day, even though all bids stay the same.  While the 
Table A Bid Prices determine the merit order for the whole day, in Table B periods, typically 
those with lower demand, SMP is only based on those elements of bids that reflect incremental 
costs rather than fixed costs.   
The SMP only constitutes one element of Pool prices.  The total price received by producers is 
called the Pool Purchase Price (PPP), and consists of SMP plus a capacity payment, based on the 
amount of capacity above forecast demand bid into the Pool, translated into the Loss of Load 
Probability (LOLP).  However, it is not the capacity made available for the half hour in question 
that matters. Instead, LOLP is based on the maximum availability of units over the previous 
seven days.  Hence it is possible for LOLP, and therefore capacity payments, to be low even 
when the system is relatively short of spare capacity because a lot more capacity was available 
over the previous week.4 
The price paid by those buying from the Pool is the Pool Selling Price (PSP) and, during Table A 
periods, it includes, in addition to the PPP, elements to recover capacity payments to generators 
available but not producing, ancillary service costs and costs related to meeting differences 
between actual and forecast demand.   In the empirical section I primarily focus on the SMP and 
the difference between the PSP and SMP as measures of prices.  The PSP reflects total payments 
to generators and includes some amounts in addition to payments for power actually supplied.  
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 Further details of the Pool's operations can be found in a number of papers including Sweeting (2000) and 
the references therein, as well as The Electricity Pool (1996) 
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However, its definition has changed over time (particularly with the exclusion of elements 
relating to transmission constraints in April 1997), whereas the definition of SMP, which is a 
simpler reflection of the price clearing the electricity auction, has remained the same across the 
period I look at empirically. 
2.2 Market Developments 
Table 1 gives capacity shares, by owner and by fuel, for 1995-2000 (the time period covered by 
my dataset).  As noted under the table NP and PG dominated output to a larger extent in 1990/91, 
and at that time there was no Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) generation capacity.  Two 
forces have led to the dramatic shifts in shares away from NP and PG, and away from coal.  First, 
since the early 1990s there has been a large amount of entry by new CCGT plant, much of it 
operated by independents, frequently financed on the back of long-term contracts with the RECs 
(the regional electricity supply companies which until 1998 were the sole suppliers to small 
business and domestic customers in their regions, and were therefore price regulated).  CCGT 
entry had reached 21.7 GW by 2000/01.5 
CCGT plant is operated almost entirely as baseload, with the effect that coal plants have been 
pushed further out along the supply curve.  Meanwhile NP and PG have closed a number of older, 
smaller coal, oil and peaking plants, amounting to 15.2 GW of capacity.6  The possibility of 
further new entry from 1998 was reduced by the Labour government's implementation of the so-
called "Restricted Consents Policy", which limited government approvals for more new 
generation.  Entry by plant with existing approvals continued. 
Second, since 1995, there has been a process of divestiture by NP and PG of coal plants and  
peaking gas turbines partly at the behest of the regulator.  The first divestiture involved NP and 
PG divesting 6,222 MW (3,938 MW, 2,284 MW respectively) to Eastern Group (later bought by 
TXU) in April 1996.  This coincided with the end of a two-year period during which NP and PG 
had agreed to keep average and demand-weighted average prices below certain levels.  The 
regulator hoped that divestiture would "prevent prices being held above a competitive level" 
without the need for artificial price restraints.7 However, the Eastern divestiture was performed as 
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a lease with a peculiar feature: a £6 per MWh generated leasing fee went to the original owners.8  
This, of course, increased Eastern's marginal costs: the effects of this are discussed in more detail 
below. 
The second round of divestiture began in summer 1999, reflecting both OFGEM's continued 
concerns about Pool price manipulation and the desire of NP and PG to vertically integrate with 
large electricity supply firms (Midlands Electricity and East Midlands Electricity respectively).  
EFM bought 3,886 MW of capacity from PG in  July 1999, AES bought the 3,870 MW Drax 
plant from NP in August 1999 (operational in November) and British Energy (BE) bought 1,960 
MW of capacity from NP in Nov 1999 (operational in February).  No leasing fees were involved.  
However, these divestitures created two further issues of interest.  First, the Edison divestiture 
gave significant coal capacity to a firm that already controlled E&W's pumped storage capacity 
(as well as some CCGT plant) having purchased this from NGC in December 1995.  Pumped 
storage plants frequently set prices during higher demand periods each day (as seen in Table 4 
(b)).  This raised the possibility that Edison’s incentives and ability to manipulate prices might be 
greater than if it was simply an operator of the coal plants.  Second, BE is the operator of the 
UK's more modern nuclear plants, which operate as baseload.  The purchase of coal plant made it 
the country’s second largest operator by capacity and output, with potential incentives to operate 
its small amount of coal capacity strategically. 
 
3 Models of the E&W Wholesale Market 
A number of models have been used to explain and predict prices in the Pool.  Two predictions 
are common to these models.  First, when the price setting part of the market was under the 
control of the NP and PG duopoly prices should have been substantially above cost.  Second, 
declining concentration, especially to the levels seen since mid-1999, should have significantly 
reduced prices and mark-ups.  In this section I first review the predicted effects of 
deconcentration resulting divestiture by incumbents and deconcentration as a consequence of new 
entry.  I then estimate a simple Cournot model designed to capture some particular features of the 
market, such as the £6/MWh fee, which have not been included in earlier models.  I do not 
consider models of collusion, even though good information about technology and the frequently 
repeated nature of the electricity auction make it potentially susceptible to collusion. The 
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literature has not developed formal models of collusion in this market perhaps because prices in 
the early 1990s were below levels predicted by static models.  I also do not consider models of 
“learning” although learning could well be a feature of this market as there may well be multiple 
equilibria even in static games. 
An important general feature of models of wholesale electricity markets such as England and 
Wales is the shape of the aggregate marginal cost schedule.  Figure 2 shows the estimated 
marginal cost curve for 15 January and 15 July 1997 based on the units that were available on 
those days. If availability is restricted strategically then the true curve would be below the one 
shown. The cost data used to draw the curve is described in Appendix A, and in addition I assume 
that nuclear plants have zero marginal cost and that the interconnectors bid at cost.  It is generally 
fairly flat for most levels of demand but has a very steep slope where supply is close to total 
capacity.  If demand gets to levels close to the steeply sloped part of the cost curve even 
competitive prices can be high and, in addition, even reasonably small generators may be able to 
increase prices by withholding capacity.   
3.1 Supply Function Equilibria Models 
Green and Newbery (1992) and Green (1996) use the Supply Function Equilibria (SFE) approach 
of Klemperer and Meyer (1989) to estimate models of the Pool.  The SFE approach works around 
the realization of demand being uncertain so each producer has a {price, quantity} supply 
schedule rather than offering a fixed price as in Bertrand or fixed quantity as in Cournot. An 
important feature of the SFE approach is that, when there is an upper limit on the possible 
realizations of demand, there are multiple equilibria ranging from the competitive (prices equal 
marginal cost) to one where prices and quantities are Cournot at the highest demand realization.9  
Although there is little demand uncertainty in E&W (especially for SMP which is based on a day-
ahead forecast of demand calculated using an algorithm available to generators), they argue that 
demand variation over a range of volumes during the day over which bids apply is analytically 
equivalent to demand uncertainty within that range.10 
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 For example, the imagine that three different levels of demand will occur during the day (High, Medium 
and Low) for 8, 16 and 24 half-hour periods respectively.  Then, at least with risk-neutral generators, this is 
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outcomes.  However the models are only equivalent when firms have to keep the same supply schedule for 
the entire day.  As I discuss below there is scope for generators to vary their availability during the day and 
therefore change the shape of their supply functions.  
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Based on parameters chosen to reflect the state of the market at privatization (although using firm 
symmetry) Green and Newbery find that both divestiture, from duopoly to a five firm oligopoly, 
and entry, by independent CCGT plant, should have large effects on average prices. Using the 
highest SFE (Cournot at the daily peak), average prices under a symmetric quintopoly would be 
£27/MWh, compared £41/MWh under a symmetric duopoly.  The price under marginal cost 
pricing would be £23/MWh.  Maximisation of duopoly profits in the face of a free entry threat 
would reduce prices to £30/MWh with around 8 GW of entry taking place (about the volume 
which actually did take place by 1994/95).11  In fact annual average SMP in the early 1990s was 
between £19 and £24/MWh (and average PSP was around £1 higher) indicating that even if 
Green and Newbery slightly overestimated costs mark-ups were far lower than they predicted.12 
Divestiture has an effect similar to that in a Cournot model: a firm with less inframarginal 
capacity has weaker incentives to raise prices.  Independent entry has two effects: the static 
Cournot effect that entry reduces residual demand for the oligopoly and the additional effect that 
oligopolists are able to choose a lower static SFE in order to reduce the scope for entry increasing 
their joint profits.   
Green (1996) uses the linear SFE (between the Cournot and Bertrand cases) to study the effects of 
different divestiture options (for the 1996 divestiture) on prices and welfare.  Under the 
assumption of linear marginal costs a linear SFE exists, and in fact it is the only SFE when 
demand uncertainty is unbounded.  Green chooses parameters to fit the market prior to 
divestiture.  Based on divestiture of 20% of NP's and PG's plants to two parties, mark-ups above 
marginal cost are predicted to fall by around 50%. Divestiture into five equal size firms would 
result in mark-ups falling a further 50%.13 
The effects on prices are not affected that much by whether new owners bid competitively (at 
marginal cost) or use supply functions above marginal cost like NP and PG.  However, as Green 
notes, competitive bidding tends to have a negative effect on productive efficiency, as 
competitive bidders will use less efficient plant at the margin than strategic bidders.  This effect 
also appears for smaller bidders in a Cournot model, as I discuss below. Green's modeling does 
not consider the issue of the £6/MWh fee or the influence of the fact that owners of divested plant 
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own pre-existing capacities.14 Entry does not change the slope of the supply functions but by 
reducing the size of oligopoly’s (residual) demand does reduce prices. 
An important feature of the market is that a large proportion of output is covered by hedging 
Contracts for Differences (CfDs), which reduce the exposure of both generators and Pool 
customers to variations in the Pool price.  A typical two-way CfD specifies a volume and a price.  
The generator pays the customer (for example, a REC) the difference between the Pool Price 
(either the SMP or PSP, depending on the contract) and the contract price, multiplied by the 
volume in the contract whenever the Pool price is above the contract price.  In a two-stage model, 
signing contracts in the first stage reduces the effective infra-marginal capacity in the second 
stage spot market.  This reduces generator's incentives to restrict output and bid up prices.  Green 
(1999) examines this in a SFE framework, although when generators have Cournot conjectures in 
the contract market the equilibrium is that they sign no contracts.  However, given that they do 
sign contracts, we can see that the effects of divestiture will tend to reduce prices both via the 
contract market (more contracts will be sold, hence reducing inframarginal capacity in the spot 
market) and via the standard SFE effects on the spot market.  The possibility of entry by new 
baseload plant may also encourage generators to sign contracts in order to commit to aggressive 
pricing.  In this case we might expect the government’s restricted consents policy to reduce 
contract volumes (unfortunately not observed) and to have increased prices.  Prior to the policy, 
the decrease in CCGT entry costs (OFGEM (2000), Figure 2.5 estimates that capital costs per 
KW have halved over the 1990s) should have forced prices downwards if generators have been 
engaging in pricing to limit the amount of CCGT entry.15 
3.2 Auction-based approaches 
The main alternative approach to modeling the E&W market is to use the logic of multi-unit 
auctions, in the manner of von der Fehr and Harbord (1993).  This approach is attractive because 
it takes into accounts the facts that the units which generators bid into the market are discrete (so 
the same bid has to apply for a particular volume of electricity) and that the demand forecast used 
to set the price is inelastic (no SFE or Cournot equilibrium exists in this case).  However, no 
account is made of the fact that bids apply to 48 different demand realizations (so bids are not 
based on a complicated optimizations across these periods) and the model has only been 
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implemented for cases of constant marginal cost.  In this case, when generators know that 
demand is sufficiently low that none of them can be guaranteed to supply, prices will be 
competitive.  If all generators know that they are necessary for supply, prices could be 
unbounded, and von der Fehr and Harbord invoke a maximum price, perhaps created by implicit 
regulation.  In between there are mixed strategy equilibria, as well as pure strategy equilibria.  In 
fact, if uncertainty about the level of demand is high (in particular if it is greater than any firm's 
capacity) then no pure strategy equilibria exist.16 
Despite the lack of clear solutions, the (unsurprising) effects of divestiture and entry are clear and 
potentially very strong.   Divestiture of capacity makes it more likely that demand will fall in the 
range where no generator can be guaranteed to supply, and hence should increase the proportion 
of the time that prices are set competitively.  Entry, by reducing the residual demand has the same 
effect.  Similarly divestiture and entry make it less likely that levels of demand are such that all 
generators know that they are required will be reached.  
3.3 Availability Strategies 
SFE and auction models have focused on the question of how generators bid a given amount of 
capacity.  However, Newbery (1995) and Patrick and Wolak (1997) note that it is not necessarily 
correct to take available capacities as given: instead these could also be subject to strategic 
manipulation.  Newbery (1995) presents a very simple model, under which larger generators have 
incentives to restrict availability in order to raise capacity payments (part of PPP) on their 
available and uncontracted plant. Divestiture, by decreasing inframarginal capacity and increasing 
contracting should reduce the incentives for this kind of manipulation, leading to an increase in 
availability over time.  On the other hand, entry by more efficient plant would tend to lead to a 
decline in the observed availability of less efficient existing plants. 
As outlined above, manipulation of capacity payments requires capacity to have reduced 
availability for at least seven days.  Patrick and Wolak (1997) also informally suggest a strategy 
through which generators might use within day availability variation in order to influence prices.  
One of the limitations on generators' bidding is that their bids have to be kept the same for the 
whole day.  However, availability can be varied during the day, and varying availability allows 
the slope of the bid function to be changed during the day even when bids cannot.  By giving 
generators additional freedom it expands the scope to raise prices, and it also suggests that an 
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SFE approach, which assumes that generators have to maintain the same supply schedules 
throughout the day, may not capture an important feature of the market.  However, generators can 
only use within-day availability strategically when the plant declared unavailable is infra-
marginal.  When it is extra-marginal it will have no effect on the SMP or, as it is only within-day 
variation, on capacity payments.  These distinctions are not made by Patrick and Wolak.  
Although there is no formal model of generators using availability behaviour the usual 
consequence of divestiture - less inframarginal capacity reducing incentives for strategic 
behaviour - would seem to apply. 
3.4 A Simple Cournot Model 
In order to get some sense of the likely effects of adding two features of divestiture, the £6/MWh 
Eastern fee and EFM's ownership of pumped storage plant, I estimated several versions of a 
simple Cournot model with asymmetric cost functions and capacity constraints.  The actual 
amount of entry happening in the market is also taken into account.  If the parameters are taken as 
applying around the daily peak in demand, then the results are those which would apply for the 
peak period under the highest SFE.  As prices for the rest of the day would be lower, average 
prices would be significantly less than those estimated by the model. 
For each estimation, the demand side is kept the same in order to focus on the effect on changes 
in the supply side.  This is also reasonable given that the demand side is very stable over the 
period - average demand increases about 5% over the whole 6 years. I assume linear demand, 
with a demand curve of Q=56,000 - 250 P (quantity measured in MWhs).17  The value of 250 is 
chosen to correspond to the central case of Green and Newbery (1992).18  Based on this demand 
curve, I estimate the model for parameters corresponding to a "1995" model, two "1997" models 
(Eastern divestiture without the £6/MWh fee, and with the fee) and three "1999" models (adding 
the EFM and AES divestitures to the two cases above, and also calculating the case where EFM 
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does not also own pumped storage capacity but including the fee).  I do not consider the BE 
divestiture, in order to avoid dealing with constraints that nuclear plants cannot be used 
strategically.  I also do not consider the effect of contracts. 
For each model, I specify the capacities for each fuel type owned by each operator in the market 
for each different year.  This is done by finding the maximum capacity bid by a unit in the year in 
question (using my availability data described in Appendix 1) and by allocating units to the 
relevant generators.  I make an assumption that 90% of this capacity is available on the day in 
question for all fuel types.  This is an ad-hoc assumption to reflect the fact that even during the 
winter some plant is unavailable due to maintenance.  It is not supposed to capture strategic 
availability decisions.  I then aggregate capacities of the nuclear plants, the interconnectors and 
independent CCGT plant (which includes operators such as EFM and AES before they purchase 
coal plants) and deduct these capacities from the intercept of the demand curve, i.e. I assume that 
they operate.  This will be true if these suppliers act as a competitive fringe at the prices predicted 
by the model as they have estimated marginal costs that are lower than the predicted prices.19 
The next step is to specify the marginal cost curves roughly approximating to my cost data.  I 
specify a linear industry marginal cost curve for CCGT, between a marginal cost of £8/MWh and 
£11/MWh for the volume of CCGT capacity in the market (which expands over time).  I also 
specify a combined marginal cost curve for coal, oil and gas plant.  This curve is 
11+0.0004*QCOAL      0<QCOAL<20,000 MW 
         11+0.0004*QCOAL + 0.000001(QCOAL - 20000)²     QCOAL>20,000 MW 
The linear section of the marginal cost curve takes marginal cost up to £19/MWh.  Where 
appropriate £6/MWh is added to Eastern's marginal fuel costs.  Firms share the CCGT and coal 
supply curves in proportion to their CCGT and coal capacities.  For example, if firm A has 2 GW 
(2.22 GW before the 90% availability adjustment) of available CCGT capacity then the function 
for the relevant part of its cost function, is 
            8
3
2000+



 *qCCGT
A
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may well bid strategically but I have no information on their costs.   If I assumed that the interconnectors 
did bid strategically this would increase the predicted prices. 
13 
These capacities are also estimated from the availability data, and hence reflect the asymmetries 
in the market.  Asymmetric capacities create asymmetric cost functions, although no attempt is 
made to capture the fact that we know which generators own particular units (for example, that 
AES's coal capacity is at Drax which is more efficient than most coal plants).  I do not include 
changes in fuel costs over time, in order to focus on the structure of the supply side.  Taking into 
account the fall in fuel prices over the period would reduce the price estimates for later years.  
Pumped storage is assumed to have an (exogenous) marginal cost of £16/MWh (reflecting a 
premium over average nighttime prices).  For the "1999" models a flat section at £16/MWh is 
included as a flat segment in EFM's marginal cost curve. 
The model is then estimated taking into account the relevant capacity constraints.  As well as 
prices and volumes, I also estimate the cost of production by the oligopoly and the productively 
efficient cost of producing the same output.  The results are shown in Table 2.  It is clear that 
divestiture is expected to have a large effect on price in line with the models discussed above.  
The marginal cost of efficient production for all the scenarios is between £16 and £17/MWh 
implying the mark-ups halve between "1995" and "1999" although they remain substantial (the 
industry Lerner Index for 1999 is around 0.5).  The size of mark-ups reflect the Cournot modeling 
assumption, the small number of producers and the low elasticity of demand at prices close to the 
competitive level.  Prices are increased, but not by much, through the two provisions of interest.  
The £6/MWh fee and giving coal plants to the pumped storage generator each increase price by 
around £1/MWh.  Of course, we would expect the fee to have a larger impact in off-peak hours.  
For example, during low demand periods prices often fall to around £10-12/MWh, around the 
marginal fuel cost of even the most efficient coal plants.  With a premium of £6/MWh the Eastern 
plants would be removed from the market entirely at these prices.  In this case, at those hours the 
market would remain a duopoly and marginal cost schedules will have been steepened by the 
removal of some efficient coal plants from the market, so standard oligopoly logic would predict 
that divestiture should increase prices.  Of course, as bids apply to all hours the actual equilibrium 
in the market should be more complicated.  However it is clear that a model focusing on the peak 
may underestimate the increase in prices caused by the premium.20 
In my model, both features actually improve productive efficiency (though the creation of smaller 
generators by divestiture works in the other direction), even though they increase prices.  This 
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 The Cournot model developed above does not capture this situation very well unless the slope parameter 
in the demand is increased dramatically.  This is because the model only predicts prices close to cost at 
very low demand levels or where demand is very elastic.   
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comes from the standard feature of Cournot models that one would like to redistribute output 
from small firms to large firms who have lower marginal costs at equilibrium levels of output.  
When Eastern is taxed NP and PG, which have plants with lower marginal costs on the margin, 
increase their output.  When EFM owns pumped storage plants (always inframarginal in 
equilibrium) it reduces the inefficiently high output from its coal plants.  Divestiture itself has two 
effects on productive efficiency.  First, it makes NP and PG more symmetric improving 
efficiency (in 1999, it makes NP and PG more symmetric with Eastern). This effect is small as by 
1995 the NP and PG were fairly similar is size, partly because PG owns more CCGT capacity.  
Second, it creates small firms who tend to use their capacity less inefficiently, even though this 
acts to reduce prices.  Of course, in an off-peak model where Eastern's plant is removed from the 
market productive inefficiency would be increased, not reduced, by the premium. 
In summary, this simple model would lead us to expect to see prices falling and productive 
efficiency decreasing with the first divestiture, and prices falling further in 1999.  However, it is 
also noticeable that mark-ups remain high even with divestiture, reflecting the low demand 
elasticity at lower mark-ups.21  This raises the issue of how we should interpret the results of a 
model concerning price changes when the model does not necessarily predict the initial level of 
prices with accuracy.22  If something else has limited prices, for example the threat of regulatory 
intervention, then the relevant questions to ask are whether falling concentration has reduced 
unconstrained prices to below the regulator-constrained levels and what effects it may have on the 
regulator’s ability to influence generators.  If unconstrained prices remain above the constrained 
levels (reflecting low demand elasticity or tacit collusion) and divestiture make the regulator’s job 
harder (as it becomes more difficult to intervene a second time without admitting that the initial 
policies failed to work), then falling concentration could increase mark-ups rather than reducing 
them.  
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 However, if prices are supposed to represent prices at the daily peak, the model predicts prices which are 
roughly similar in magnitude to those seen in the market (mean prices for the periods with the highest four 
SMPs each day are between £35 and £55 for nearly every quarter 1995-2000).  As I discuss in the next 
section it is quite possible that basing a marginal cost estimate on efficient-operation fuel costs is not 
appropriate at the peak.  This could explain why we observe prices which are higher than are predicted by 
the Cournot model. 
22
 Most models have therefore been interpreted as giving predictions about relative prices under alternative 
market structures rather than as giving absolute price predictions. 
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4 Prices, bidding behaviour and efficiency 1995-2000 
The predictions concerning the effects of divestiture, the £6/MWh fee and entry are compared 
with the evidence from 1995-2000.  Section 4.1 examines what happened to prices and mark-ups, 
while Section 4.2 focuses on the identity of the price-setter.  Section 4.3 looks at bidding 
behaviour, while Section 4.4 examines availability in the light of the suggestions of Patrick and 
Wolak (1997) that this may be used strategically.  Section 4.5 implements a simple method for 
calculating the productive efficiency of coal fired generation.  The data used in the analysis is 
described in Appendix 1. 
4.1 Prices and Mark-ups 
Figures 3(a) and (b) show the 30-day moving average of SMP and the difference between PSP 
and SMP, which is composed of capacity payments and some charges to recover ancillary service 
costs and the costs of having to provide additional power to meet higher than expected demand.  
The very low values of SMP in early 1995 have been identified in earlier studies and is associated 
with a particular period of regulatory pressure.23  Comparing the post-April 1996 period, i.e. 
following both the first divestiture and the end of the price-cap, with the prior period suggests that 
there was no marked decrease in average SMP.  Following the second divestiture average SMP 
was lower and seasonality was less marked over winter 1999/00.  However, from Figure 3(b) it is 
clear that, after the second divestiture, the average difference between PSP and SMP (including 
capacity payments) increased.  This meant that the overall level of prices paid from those 
purchasing from the Pool did not decline.  The figure also indicates that entry or the threat of 
entry combined with falling entry costs did not drive prices downwards.  There is also no obvious 
break following the introduction of the “restricted consents” policy at the start of 1998. 
Given that a price-cap was in operation from April 1994-1996 it is also interesting to compare 
prices with years before 1994 for which I do not have data.  Table 3 uses data from Patrick and 
Wolak's Tables 1and 2 to provide a comparison for SMP and the ratio of SMP to PSP.  The 
average SMP column suggests that SMP levels are fairly similar to those prior to the price cap, 
with (as we would expect) lower prices in the summer.  The second column indicates that prior to 
the price cap SMP/PSP was generally between the extremes we see in the later period.  Taken 
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 For example, Green (1999) comments that "Following a strongly-worded statement from the regulator, 
National Power and PowerGen kept their bids very low for the remaining two months of the financial 
year". 
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together with the combination of low inflation and declining fuel prices, these numbers suggest 
that neither entry nor divestiture have had the expected effect on outcome prices.   
The last two columns divides periods into Table A and Table B periods.  Table B (about one-fifth 
of all periods) are those periods each day which are considered to be off-peak, and have fewer 
elements of bids included in the price.  The prices generally move together, but the Table B prices 
tend to increase slightly relative to Table A prices, as well as increasing absolutely.  This would 
be consistent with the £6 premium decreasing competition and increasing costs in low demand 
periods, even if divestiture has some effect in restraining prices at higher demand periods.  Of 
course, if it is the fear of regulatory intervention that caps prices in higher demand periods, then 
the effect of the premium and divestiture might be to make consumers unambiguously worse 
off.24 
While the pattern of prices is of some interest because it avoids the need to make estimates of 
marginal cost, mark-ups are the informative statistic for an assessment of the extent of market 
power.   I follow Wolfram (1998) and (1999) in forming a direct estimate of marginal fuel cost 
for each plant using data on plant efficiencies and fuel prices (see Appendix 1).  Unlike Wolfram  
I know the identity of the marginal plant so I can  calculate the mark-up (SMP less cost estimate) 
of the unit setting the marginal price and divide through by SMP to set the Lerner Index for the 
period.25  Figure 4(a) shows the moving average of the Lerner Index based on SMP.  The upward 
drift is greater than that seen in prices for two reasons.  First, fuel prices, and in particular coal 
prices, have fallen since 1995.  For example, the price in contracts with successors of British Coal 
fell from 137p/GJ for the period from 1995 to 122p/GJ in March 1998, and there was a similar 
trend in world coal prices.  Second, the displacement of the most efficient coal plants from 
providing baseload and the closure of old plants has tended to make the marginal plant more 
efficient.  The average Lerner Index following the second divestiture is above the level during the 
price cap, even when the very low prices at the start of 1995 are excluded. 
Of course, calculating the Lerner Index in this way is likely subject to various types of bias, even 
if my estimates of plant efficiencies and fuel costs are accurate.  First, other elements of cost (for 
example, the elements of labour cost that are marginal) may be increasing over the period, 
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 Wolfram (1999) argues that the 1994-96 price cap should have led to the generator's reducing off-peak 
prices to maintain prices at higher levels of demand.  This would also explain these results.  However, 
Wolfram's argument is premised on the average price element of the cap being more biding that the demand 
weighted element. 
25
 Wolfram (1999) used an estimate of the supply curve to calculate an estimate of marginal cost for the 
quantity of electricity generated.   
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leading my direct method to overestimate mark-ups by an increasing amount over time.  Second, 
using efficient operation heat rates is likely to understate the true marginal cost of plants that 
operate only at the daily peak.  For example, coal plants which have fluctuating output during the 
day will operate less efficiently and so have higher marginal costs.  In addition, they may also 
need to recover some fixed costs of operation via the marginal price in the few periods in which 
they operate, although in E&W this point is limited in its importance by the fact that generators 
can receive additional payments from the System Operator if they are estimated not to have 
recovered their submitted Start-Up costs.  Hence the daily supply curve is likely to be above the 
“efficient operation” estimated supply curve even when both are based on the same unit 
availability.  In addition, the daily curve could be significantly steeper than the efficient operation 
curve at the peak.  The possibility that the daily supply curve is higher and steeper than the 
efficient operation curve is consistent with the evidence on prices shown in Figure 2.  Here for 
January 1997 and July 1997 I plot prices (SMP) at the daily minimum and peak of daily demand, 
along with the supply curves for 15 January 1997 and 15 July 1997 respectively.  The minimum 
demand can be met by plant which can operate as baseload for the rest of the day and so can run 
continuously.  The marginal costs of these plants should be around the efficient operation 
marginal costs estimated above.  Consistent with a competitive outcome minimum prices are at or 
even below the estimated marginal cost curve.  In contrast, maximum prices are significantly 
above the curve. The question of how bad an approximation the efficient operation curve is to the 
within-day curve has not been addressed in the literature.  However, this clearly means that the 
interpretation of estimated mark-ups have to be treated with extreme caution, especially as the 
identity of plants that have varying output has changed over time reflecting new entry.  In spite of 
these reservations I interpret the mark-up results as indicating that mark-ups have not fallen 
markedly in the way that existing models or my Cournot model predicted.  The caveat is that it is 
hard to distinguish whether prior to deconcentration prices were close to competitive levels, or 
whether they have remained substantially above competitive levels.  Notably however, prices 
show considerable variation at the daily peak even for similar levels of demand and times of days, 
as illustrated by Figure 4.  This fact would tend to support the claim that sometimes prices are 
significantly above cost.  However, there is no simple reason why so much more market power 
should be exercised on some days rather than others.  The role of multiple equilibria and learning 
are two possibilities I intend to investigate in future work. 
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4.2 Ownership of the Price-setting Unit 
As I know the identity of the marginal plant, I am also able to examine who sets prices, at what 
levels and at what times of the day.  This is particularly interesting as it allows a partial 
assessment of which generators are driving high prices and, in particular, whether divested 
owners tend to set prices less often or at lower levels.  It also allows an examination of the 
hypothesis that the £6/MWh fee should lead to Eastern setting prices less frequently off-peak.  
Table 4(a) shows shares of price setting and the average SMP set for Table A and Table B periods 
for each six month period by coal plants (which, as Table 4(b) illustrates, set SMP the majority of 
the time).  Two features immediately emerge, which suggest that the fee may have an effect.  
Eastern sets prices far more rarely in Table B periods than in Table A periods, and during Table 
A periods it sets higher prices than other operators of coal plants.  Formally, t-tests reject the 
hypothesis that Eastern sets similar prices to other operators, although such tests also reject that 
other operators set similar prices for most periods reflecting the large number of observations.  
The other divested coal plant owners seem to set prices at similar levels to NP and PG.  During 
Table B periods the prices Eastern sets are similar to those of the other generators. 
One explanation of these results would be that the fee has little effect, but that Eastern simply 
owns plants with higher costs.  My cost data suggests that the Eastern stations are fairly similar in 
efficiency to those of NP, even if they are less efficient than the plants that remain with PG 
following divestiture.  Combining the coal price data with the efficiencies also indicates that even 
a difference in efficiency of 8 percentage points would only give a cost difference of £2/MWh, 
smaller than the observed difference and the size of the fee.26  I also compared with the prices set 
by the same units in 1995, prior to divestiture.  As would be suggested by the efficiency figures, 
the NP plants that went to Eastern set prices significantly lower than the NP average in 1995, 
whereas the prices set by the PG plants were above the PG average.  Hence a cost explanation is 
not implausible, but an explanation based on the fee is also entirely consistent with the evidence. 
For Table A periods I also examined the level of prices set by pumped storage plants (which 
rarely set prices in Table B periods).  EFM's ownership brings no immediate change in price set, 
and the upward shift occurs before EFM's ownership of coal plants (although EFM was 
developing its CCGT ownership prior to 1999).  In part this upward trend could be caused by the 
increase in off-peak electricity prices seen above, as off-peak electricity is the primary input to 
pumped storage plants. 
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 My cost data suggests that the most efficient coal plants have efficiencies of around 38%. 
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4.3 Bidding Behaviour 
The data allows an analysis of generators' bidding behaviour.  In this sub-section I look both at 
stations average bids and employ the methodology of Wolfram (1998) to analyse whether 
generators bid "strategically". 
Table 5 shows the average bids of coal stations and pumped stations for each six month period in 
the sample.  I focus on coal plants as they are the most likely to set the clearing price and are also 
the ones divested.  I use the formulae given in Appendix 1 to create the daily bids for each unit 
and then average across all units in the station for the half-year in question, treating those days 
when a unit is unavailable as missing values.  During this period coal costs were generally  
falling.  The first point to note is that for many stations bids are fairly volatile, which does not 
reflect any observable evidence on underlying fuel costs.  Also some generators seem to increase 
their bids absolutely relative to other generators: for example, NP bids higher relative to other 
generators in October 1997-March 1998 than in other periods.  The very low prices in early 1995 
reflect the regulatory pressure described above. 
5 of the 6 stations leased by Eastern increased their bids immediately after divestiture.  The sixth, 
West Burton, had lower average bids partly because of a number of very low (<£2/MWh bids) 
which would certainly have been below cost.27 At the same time most other stations showed bid 
decreases or small increases.  This would support the notion that the £6/MWh premium had an 
effect on bidding behaviour, although the Cournot analysis would not lead one to expect that it 
should dominate the competitive effect of divestiture.  From late 1996 onwards however, the bids 
of Eastern do not differ obviously from those of other generators, and, consistent with the price 
evidence, there is no obvious decline in bids. The other divestitures were associated with an 
immediate small decline in the bid levels of the divested stations.  The standard deviation of bids 
from these plants also falls which is consistent with more competitive bidding given that 
underlying costs are fairly stable.28 
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 Out of 945 coal bids of less than £2/MWh submitted during the whole sample, 721 one of them were by 
Eastern between April 1996 and September 1999.  This could potentially reflect technical constraints on 
some units although the behaviour applied to a number of units, including some not at West Burton, and, in 
addition, did not apply to the same units prior to April 1996.  Hence it would seem to be more a feature of 
Eastern’s bidding behaviour. 
28
 As noted below in the context of Wolfram (1998)'s model, strategic bidding should be sensitive to the 
availability of plant (both of the same generator and other generators) as well as to other circumstances 
which make price increasing behaviour profitable or wise (eg., regulatory scrutiny), in addition to costs. 
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Another feature of the average bids is that some efficient plants such as Drax and Ratcliffe that 
bid low and with low variance early in the period tend to bid at higher and more varying prices 
from 1997 onwards.  This reflects the more efficient coal capacity becoming increasingly 
marginal at both the firm and industry level.  At the industry level, new entry increases the 
number of periods when only a few coal units operate, especially in the summer.  At the firm 
level, divestiture may mean that efficient plants becoming more marginal for any owner.  If 
efficient plants are used to try to inflate the price and in consequence sometimes do not run this 
could undermine the productive efficiency of the merit order.  I examine this issue in more detail 
in Section 4.5. 
The pumped storage stations have increased bids and variance of bids from Winter 1997/98 
onwards. There is no further increase associated with EFM's purchase of coal plants, which 
represented an approximate doubling of its capacity.  However, the fact that EFM is submitting 
pumped stations at higher bids than it did earlier is one reason why prices do not decline (as Table 
4(b) shows pumped plants set prices a significant amount of the time).  A higher variance in 
bidding is, as already noted, consistent with plants being used strategically.29 
Wolfram (1998) combined bidding data with cost data, and used regression analysis to estimate 
whether generators bid strategically in the Pool from 1992-94.  The basic idea is simple.  
Generators are uncertain about the bids of their rivals and hence set their bids for each unit by 
trading off the loss from bidding too high (causing the unit not to run) and the potential gain from 
increasing prices (for the unit and for all inframarginal units) when the unit is marginal.  A 
generator is defined to bid "strategically" when it bids more for a given unit when it has greater 
inframarginal capacity, smaller capacity for the unit in question (this lowers the cost to being 
placed out of merit when price is above marginal cost) and when the units of rivals that usually 
compete most closely with this unit are not available.  Wolfram claims to find some evidence of 
strategic bidding in the E&W market using data from 1992-94.  I repeated Wolfram's analysis for 
my data and Table 6 contains the results from the analogue of her instrumental variables 
specification, using only coal plants.30 
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 Of course, pumped storage stations have costs which are dependent on the future price of electricity.  
They can therefore be rather unstable over time.  An increase in off-peak prices, caused for example by the 
Eastern fee, would also increase pumped stations costs and its bids by more than one pound for every 
pound increase.  This may be once source of the bid increase. 
30
 I use coal plants as these are the fossil fuel plants most likely to set prices, and hence likely to bid 
strategically.  For her study, Wolfram did not have access to the identity of the price setting plant, so used 
all fossil fuel plants.  One further difference from Wolfram's study is that I use quarters rather than months 
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In order to examine the effects of divestiture I include interactions with three time periods (Period 
0: pre-April 1996, Period 1: April 1996-September 1999, Period 2:September 1999-September 
2000).  The variable definitions and the construction of the instruments are described in Appendix 
1.  The results in column 3 suggest that strategic bidding by NP and PG has persisted over time, 
at least based on the LOG(AVAILABILITY) variable and, to a lesser extent, the LOG(CAPACITY) 
coefficients.  The small size and non-significance of Bid Impact is robust to different samples. In 
fact the availability coefficient suggests that NP and PG may bid more, rather than less, 
strategically in Periods 1 and 2 than in Period 0.  This would be consistent with the end of the 
price cap or the fact that NP and PG must act more strategically to maintain prices at the level just 
acceptable to the regulator in a divested market than before.  In period 2 an F-test cannot reject 
the hypothesis that NP and PG bid their plants similarly to the divested plant owners.31 
The magnitude of the coefficients would suggest that when a generator has 10% more 
inframarginal capacity available, bids increase by around 65 pence (based on the column 1 
coefficient), which is about three times larger than the effect found by Wolfram.32  On the other 
hand, it seems as if Eastern (the only non-NP/PG owner in period 1) does bid less strategically. If 
Eastern would still have bid less strategically without the fee (a strong assumption) this would 
further suggest that the fee did serve to increase prices.  A potential drawback of the approach is 
that if marginal costs are higher when plant is more marginal, as discussed above, then the results 
will be biased towards a finding of strategic bidding.  However, even in this case it is of interest 
that Eastern seems to bid relatively less strategically then NP and PG. 
Overall the pattern of bidding behaviour is consistent with the evidence from prices and mark-ups 
in the sense that falling concentration has no clear effect on bids or outcomes, and that there is 
substantial variation over time which cannot be explained by (apparent) cost or demand factors.  
Variation in the level and variance of bids is suggestive of non-competitive bidding, especially 
when the bids of all operators tend to move together without an obvious cost explanation.33   
There is some evidence that the premium does affect the behaviour of Eastern, which would be 
consistent with the evidence from price-setting. 
                                                                                                                                                               
to form my variables.  This is possible because I have a continuous set of months whereas she had a 
selection of months for each year. 
31
 F(1,98678)=0.70, P(F>0.70 under H0 that the coefficient on availability is the same)=0.4042 
32
 The difference could however be attributed to my use of quarters rather than months, as quarters provide 
more variation.  Using months gives coefficients closer to Wolfram levels. 
33
 When all bids move together it is harder to attribute the increase in bids to a particular plant simply 
becoming more marginal. 
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4.4 Availability 
One potential problem with the Wolfram methodology is that availability may be used 
strategically (Wolfram (1998), pg. 721-22), as has been suggested by Patrick and Wolak (1997).34  
As well as arguing from the size of capacity payments, they contend that the availability 
performance of NP and PG was poor relative to both that of independents in E&W and 
international standards, as summarised by NERC figures from the US.  Their measure of 
availability is based on comparing actual availability over the course of the year to maximum 
possible availability based on unit nameplate capacities at the end of the year (1995).  No 
distinction is made between infra-marginal and extra-marginal availability or between within-day 
and between day variation.  This is in spite of the fact that, as indicated above, parts of their 
argument rely on variation in the availability of infra-marginal capacity within days.  Tables 7-9 
give various statistics on availability for my data, and I try to make these distinctions.   
In Table 7 the NERC figures from Patrick and Wolak are given underneath the fuel type, and the 
relevant Patrick and Wolak estimates underneath the owner's name.  I calculate availability in a 
slightly different way to Patrick and Wolak.  Instead of using the nameplate capacity in the 
denominator, I use the maximum availability of the unit during the six months in question.  One 
reason that this is likely to be a preferred measure is that it may be less biased by entry and exit.  
Plant which is entering the market (in particular CCGT plant) may be connected to the grid and 
have positive nameplate capacity but not be operational.  Exiting plant (especially gas and small 
coal plant) may still be connected but also not really be operational.  It seems inappropriate to 
class this plant's availability as being used to strategically manipulate capacity payments or affect 
SMP, at least in the short-run.35  In addition, nameplate capacity may simply become an 
inaccurate measure of actual capacity over time due to ageing, modifications or environmental 
restrictions.  
The bottom figure in each box in Table 7 is for availability during the entire season, and is the 
figure most comparable to the Patrick and Wolak figures.  It is given by dividing the sum of 
actual availability over the six months, by maximum availability (the highest observed 
availability multiplied by the number of half-hours in the six months).  The top figure in each box 
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 In the Wolfram analysis strategic availability decisions would lead to the instrument being correlated 
with the error, i.e. an endogeneity problem. 
35
 This does not mean that entry and exit decisions are necessarily efficient.  In particular, exit decisions 
may be made partly to influence prices in the future, although equally it may well be efficient for older 
plant to leave the market or be mothballed given the extent of excess capacity in the market.  However, this 
is different to the primarily short-term market manipulation discussed by Patrick and Wolak. 
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gives the average of a statistic reflecting within-day availability.  For every day actual availability 
is divided by maximum availability that same day multiplied by 48 (the number of periods).  
Units never available are given missing values.  This is averaged across all unit-days belonging to 
a particular owner-fuel type group.  Thus a figure of 1 might appear even if a generator does not 
have full availability, as long as on those days when plant is available it is available throughout 
the day at the same capacity. 
Several points emerge from Table 7.  I start with the seasonal availability figures.  First, my 
figures differ from those of Patrick and Wolak even for 1995, in a way that works against their 
conclusion that availability is manipulated, especially for coal and gas.  This most probably 
reflects my numbers being less affected by plants that close.  Second, coal plant is consistently 
less available in the summer than in the winter, and in the winter attains availability close to or 
above NERC levels.  Given that E&W has excess capacity, especially in the summer, this pattern 
is consistent with efficient operation: we would expect some surplus coal plant not be available in 
the summer.  Third, seasonal availability is lower for NP and PG's CCGT plants than those of 
independents, but tends not to be that different from the NERC figures for most periods.  It is also 
noticeable that Eastern's CCGT availability performance declines once it owns coal plants, 
although this is not true for AES or EFM.  PG's oil plant performance is very poor but these units 
also submit high bids, and this could well be explained by plant specific factors, as well as the 
increase in oil prices relative to coal (for my sample, oil plant has higher estimated marginal costs 
than any of the coal plants).  The seasonal evidence therefore provides only weak support for the 
Patrick and Wolak's theory. 
The within-day figures are even worse for the theory that availability id used strategically.  For 
NP availability varies less than 5% from the maximum possible for almost all periods for all fuel 
types.  PG has slightly lower performance for its coal plants, while the oil plant performance is 
poor (again suggesting plant specific factors).  One problem in assessing these figures is the lack 
of an appropriate benchmark for expected variations in ex-ante within day availability, but it is 
noticeable that in general NP and PG have similar performance to independents where these 
comparisons can be made (CCGT plants).  Notably, Eastern again appears as an outlier with 
systematically lower within-day availability performance for its coal plants.  To examine this 
further, I examined whether coal plants became unavailable within-day when they are infra-
marginal or extra-marginal.  As within day variation cannot affect capacity payments, strategic 
withdrawal can only occur when the unit is inframarginal, as otherwise SMP is not affected.  I 
take maximum availability during the whole day as the benchmark for capacity and calculate 
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actual availability for a unit as a proportion of the maximum possible for hours when its bid 
makes the unit infra-marginal, and for those hours when it is extra-marginal.36 
Table 8 shows that NP and PG’s plants have very high within-day availability for plants which 
are inframarginal.  Most availability variation is not of the sort that supports Patrick and Wolak's 
theory.  On other hand, a lot of Eastern's variation comes from times when plant is infra-marginal.  
There is no obvious theoretical reason why the £6/MWh fee should cause this: as long as bids are 
above Eastern's marginal cost whenever the plant is infra-marginal Eastern should want to 
operate.  However, remember that Eastern sometimes bids very low, below its marginal cost.  An 
alternative to bidding at the marginal cost inflated by the premium is to bid less, but simply not 
operate when the price is expected to be low.  Speculatively, this may be caused by Eastern 
worrying about the intertemporal optimization in NGC's algorithm to schedule plant.  In order to 
guarantee that it does run when it wants to run, Eastern may do better by using a low bid-limited 
availability strategy for some plant than by using bidding alone.  Such strategies may have 
important consequences for system efficiency, but in the case of Eastern there seems likely to be 
a different rationale to that proposed by Patrick and Wolak. 
As spells of unavailability for more than seven days affect the calculation of capacity payments I 
also examined the frequency of such spells.  Ideally, one would like to estimate an equation 
(similar in spirit to the Wolfram equation) to test whether the duration of spells is a function of 
the level of capacity payments and their sensitivity to availability decisions (payments are 
complicated and highly non-linear function of the reserve margin).  Of course the level of 
capacity payments is partly endogenous to the availability decision and no good instruments 
suggest themselves.  Specifications involving demand, and the availability of nuclear and 
independent plant were tried but the results were highly unstable.  This in part reflects the fact 
that the availability decisions of all generators will partly be driven by expectations of capacity 
payments (so a generator is more likely to conduct maintenance on plant at the same time that 
some other generators are doing so).  This is true even when generators are not acting 
strategically.  Hence Table 9 just shows the number of spells when coal plants are unavailable for 
more than seven days.  These spells are more frequent in the summer and increase in number over 
time.  Both are consistent with extra-marginal plant being temporarily retired (new entry pushing 
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 For example, imagine that a unit is available at 200MW for the first 20 periods, available at 100 MW for 
the next 20 and is unavailable for the last eight.  Its bid makes it inframarginal for the first 24.  The total-
within day figure calculated used in Table 8 is calculated as (200*20 + 100*20)/(200*48)=0.625.  
Inframarginal within day availability is (200*20 + 100*4)/(200*24)=0.92.  Extramarginal availability is 
(100*16)/(200*24)=0.33 
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coal plants out along the supply curve) and so are consistent with coal plant not being used 
strategically.  Of course, the increase in capacity payments in since the summer of 1999 raises the 
possibility that withdrawal is not efficient, but excessive.  
4.5 Productive Efficiency 
Finally I analyse productive efficiency.  The Cournot model and the likely effect of the £6/MWh 
fee on Eastern's off-peak bids suggested that productive efficiency might decline after the first 
round of divestiture. I therefore performed a simple productive efficiency analysis for coal plants.  
I do not have unit output figures, but I do know the merit order and the identity of the marginal 
plant, and my cost data gives a cost per MWh for each unit. 
I only use those periods when a coal plant is marginal.  For these periods I add up the available 
volume of all units in the merit order up to and including the unit which sets the SMP.  This gives 
me the volume required from coal plants.  Adding the cost of these units gives me the (estimated) 
actual cost of production.  I then re-order the plants based on cost and work out the ideal cost of 
producing the same volume assuming that unit availability is the same as it actually was.  
Repeating for every period during six months, gives me a total actual cost and a total ideal cost.  
The ratio of the total actual cost to the total ideal cost gives my efficiency statistic, with  a higher 
number indicating greater inefficiency.   
Taking availability as given will, if availability is in fact inefficient, bias my statistic downwards 
as the ideal cost will be greater than it could be.  For example if Eastern’s units are inefficiently 
unavailable off-peak I will not pick that up in my estimates.  The failure to include start-up costs 
could have a similar effect, especially given Eastern’s on-off availability strategy.  On the other 
hand, mismeasurement of unit costs would tend to bias the statistic upwards.37  From my 
perspective the main concern is that these biases should not drive the statistic upwards over time.  
If anything, the considerations concerning Eastern would seem likely to drive the bias the other 
way. 
The results are shown in Table 10.  There is some evidence of an increase in inefficiency over 
time, amounting to around 1% of system costs.  Further analysis at the owner level (not reported) 
suggests that this inefficiency comes largely from variation between generators and less efficient 
use of plant by Eastern. 
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1% of cost may seem like a small number, but it should be seen in its proper context, i.e. relative 
to the lack of apparent price decreases from the first divestiture and relative to the estimated 
benefits of privatization/restructuring.  Newbery and Pollitt (1997), using far broader sources for 
efficiency gains than I use, estimate that privatizing and restructuring the CEGB brought benefits 
of around 5% of production costs.  My simple calculations suggest that at least on the cost side 
divestiture in the way it took place may have eroded up to 20% of those gains.  Of course, these 
losses could be offset by other efficiency improvements resulting from competitive pressure such 
as more efficient purchasing or better use of labour.  Loss of economies of scope across plants 
would however work the other way.  It is also important to remember that technical inefficiency 
creates absolute deadweight loss whereas, in a market with inelastic demand, high prices largely 
result in transfers from consumers to producers and hence little welfare loss when welfare is 
measured as the sum of producer and consumer surplus. 
5 Conclusion and Implications 
This paper has examined what happened in the E&W electricity market from 1995-2000, 
focusing primarily on the effects of divestiture and to a lesser extent entry.  Contrary to the 
predictions of the standard models used in this market, prices and mark-ups appear not to have 
fallen since the early 1990s.  The £6/MWh fee involved in the Eastern divestiture may have 
played a role in this outcome, with a particularly negative effect on prices and efficiency in off-
peak hours.  The lack of a significant price effect presents a puzzle which it is worth considering 
in more detail. 
A number of features of the market were not really captured in the Cournot model or the 
empirical analysis which could plausibly affect outcomes in a significant way.  Three obvious 
examples are the role of contracts, vertical integration by the major generators and changes in the 
structure of retail markets (which were fully opened up to competition in 1999).  As discussed in 
Section 3, increased competition in the market for contracts could generally be expected to 
reinforce the effects of divestiture.  Unfortunately information on generators’ contract cover is not 
publicly available, but OFGEM has explained particular instances of high prices by generators 
having temporarily lower levels of contract cover.38  However, the level of contract cover is 
                                                                                                                                                               
37
 Imagine that the system is in fact fully efficient but that I mis-measure some plant costs (in particular I 
mis-order efficiencies, as fuel costs are assumed common across coal plants so cancel out of both the 
numerator and the denominator).  Then I will find that the system is not efficient even when it is 
38
 For example, OFGEM (2000) pg. 17, claims that high Pool prices in July 1999 were due to NP and PG 
having increased incentives to manipulate prices due to temporarily low contract cover.  
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endogenous and most CfD contracts are annual so this is unlikely to explain much of the observed 
volatility in prices and mark-ups within days and within months.  The effects of vertical 
integration need to be considered in the context of increasing competition in the supply market.  
Manipulation of Pool prices could provide a mechanism by which generators attempt to 
disadvantage non-integrated supply companies, either directly by raising prices or by increasing 
the degree of market risk.  Of course, with reasonably low concentration in the generation market 
supply companies should be able to hedge much of this risk by signing contracts with non-
integrated generators.  Alternatively, vertical integration may create a barrier to entry into the 
generation market as suggested by Green (1998).  However, vertical integration only occurred 
in1999 as did full liberalization of the supply market, so these features cannot explain the lack of 
a price effect prior to 1999.  It is worth noting that in the longer term, changes in the structure of 
the supply market which could help to reduce prices by increasing the effective elasticity of 
demand. 
If these features cannot explain the results, then there are two possible interpretations of the 
evidence presented in Section 4.  It could be the case that, if marginal costs were measured 
properly, then prices would be found to have been fairly close to competitive levels both prior to 
and after 1995.  In this case, falling concentration could not have reduced prices because there 
was little scope for them to fall.  In this case, we need to identify why it is that prices are low 
when our standard models of oligopoly suggest that they should not be.  The observed volatility 
of prices and bids suggests that this it is probably not the case that the market always acts 
competitively.   
The second interpretation is that, for some reason, market power has been largely unaffected by 
the change in market concentration.  If this is true we need to understand what actually does drive 
market power, not least because this could have implications for other electricity markets with 
similar characteristics.  Price volatility suggests that generators may be using mixed strategies or 
moving between multiple equilibria.  The use of mixed strategies would be consistent with the 
model of von der Fehr and Harbord (1993).  However, given that generators do not change their 
bids every day, even though they could do so, theory would suggest that individual generators are 
more likely to have pure strategies as strictly best responses.39 If decisions can only be taken on a 
weekly basis then mixed strategies might be consistent with the evidence.  Yet mixed strategies 
on their own would not explain why prices have not fallen because, as in the von der Fehr and 
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Harbord model, falling concentration would still lead us to predict lover prices on average.  This 
is also a problem for a theory involving multiple equilibria, as falling concentration should have 
made more competitive equilibria feasible.  Trying to develop models which explain the 
dynamics of the market (for example, by seeing how generators respond to shocks such as 
baseload capacity becoming unavailable) seems to be the logical next step in explaining why 
static models lack predictive power.  
The other possible explanation for what has happened if there is market power, is that the market 
should have been understood in terms of a game between the generators and the regulator, and 
that the regulator’s ability to restrain prices has become weaker.  Two possible reasons for this 
are that it is hard for a regulator to intervene repeatedly or (conversely) that, because history has 
shown that the regulator cannot be deterred, the incentives of the generators to try to restrain 
prices have been reduced.  For example, once it became clear that the Pool was going to be 
replaced (the first review started in 1998) the incentive of the generators to limit price to prevent 
change could well have been diminished.  If the regulator has played a key role in determining the 
level of prices then this suggests that simply changing the structure of the mechanisms that 
govern the market, as is being attempted under NETA, will not solve the regulator’s problems. 
 
 
. 
     
                                                                                                                                                               
39
 In my sample, over 60% of coal units (on average) submitted exactly the same bids and availability as 
they submitted the same before and a further 10% only changed their Table A Bid by less than £1/MWh. 
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Appendix 1: Data Appendix 
The analysis uses data purchased from ESIS Ltd. on market clearing prices and volumes for each 
half-hour, generator's bids and their availability declarations.  I also used a number of sources to 
produce estimates of generators' marginal costs.  This Appendix gives details of variable 
construction.  Table A1 gives summary statistics for bids and some of the constructed variables. 
A1.1 Price Data 
For each half-hour period I use the "Ex-post" SMP and PSP figures.  These occasionally differ 
from the SMP set day ahead due to recalculations, and are the prices used to pay generators and 
settle Pool transactions. The demand figure used is the forecast demand to be met by centrally 
dispatched units (known as QO).  The data also identifies the unit setting the marginal price.  
Ownership was identified using a number of published sources, including NGC (2000) and the 
"Producer identifier" included in the bidding data. 
The sequence of prices covers every half-hour from 1 January 1995-30 September 2000. 
A1.2 Bid and Availability Data 
There are several elements of each bid (start-up, no-load and three incremental energy prices 
along with elbow points specifying where the elbow points apply).  I combine them to form a 
single bid price, equivalent to the "Table A Bid Price" used by NGC, using the formulae below 
from Appendix E of NGC(2000).  
Bid
No Load Inc Elbow Inc Elbow Elbow Inc Avail Elbow
Avail
if Avail Elbow
Bid
No Load Inc Elbow Inc Avail Elbow
Avail
if Elbow Avail Elbow
Bid
No Load Inc Avail
Avail
if Elbow Avail
=
+ + − + −
>
=
+ + −
> >
=
+
>
1 1 2 2 1 3 2
2
1 1 2 1
2 1
1
1
* *( ) *( )
* *( )
*
 
Availability is measured by the maximum MW declared available at the time of making the bid 
available during any period during the day to which the bid applies (running from 10am to 10am 
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the next day).  In the terminology of the Pool this quantity is known as XAi. Of course, 
availability may turn out to be different from this (due to outages etc.) but the day-ahead measure 
is the appropriate measure for determining the SMP.  This measure of availability is used to 
calculate bids and to measure availability. 
I have data on the bids of all generating units, including the nuclear units and interconnectors 
from 1 January 1995-30 September 2000, with only a few missing observations (at the start of 
1997 for a few coal plants owned by Eastern). 
A1.3 Marginal Cost Data 
I calculate the marginal fuel cost per MWh for each coal station using information on heat rates 
and fuel prices.  I do not attempt to estimate other elements of marginal cost, for example labour 
costs or transport costs.40 
Heat rates for coal plants come from two main sources: Richard Green, who kindly provided me 
with the data used in Green and Newbery (1992), and McCloskey’s UK Coal Power Stations 
report.  These correspond to the main sources used by Wolfram (1998) and (1999).  Of course, 
these are more out of date by the late 1990s than they are for her studies of the E&W market in 
the early 1990s.  This should be less of an issue for established coal plants, unless there is major 
refitting going on (anecdotally only two coal plants are fitted with FGD technology).  As a check 
I also examined information from OXERA’s UtilityView Generation database and the 
environmental reports (which give fuel inputs and electricity outputs for each station) drawn up 
by the major generators.  These suggested that actual efficiency rates are slightly below the 
Green/McCloskey heat rates, by two or three percentage points.  Of course, the environmental 
numbers reflect how the plants are operated and would be reduced by strategic operation.  In 
preference, I therefore use the numbers from Green, and from McCloskey for any missing values 
(McCloskey numbers are very similar to those of Green). 
In the mark-up calculation in Section 4 I use the average contract prices reported in the press for 
power stations purchasing UK coal.  These contracts were renegotiated in March 1998, with the 
reported price falling from 137p/GJ to 122p/GJ.  I also did all the calculations using prices for 
Australian coal delivered to Europe from International Financial Statistics which goers up to the 
end of 1999.  Use of these prices give higher mark-ups for coal plants, but as I am primarily 
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 In the Wolfram IV regression equations I also included a measure of the number of miles from coal 
plants to their primary coalfield when the stations were operated by the CEGB using information from 
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interested in differences between coal plants, and use the same fuel prices for all coal plants 
whichever prices I use, this does not affect the pattern of the results.  One point about the 
efficiency data should be noted: it is at the station rather than the unit level (there are on average 
about four units in each coal plants).  Assuming that all units were installed in coal plants at the 
same time this may not be an excessive simplification. 
To calculate the moving average mark-ups I also need to calculate mark-ups on other plant types.  
For pumped plants I assume that their fuel cost is the average PSP of electricity the following 
evening (11pm-5am), and I assume an efficiency of 66%, which is similar to that implied by the 
costs assumed in Green and Newbery (1992).  Oil station efficiencies are given in the Green data, 
and fuel prices are the Heavy Fuel Oil 3.5% (CIF for NW Europe) weekly prices from 
Datastream.41  EdF and Scottish producers supplying via the interconnectors are assumed to bid at 
cost (zero markup).  The same assumption is made for the few occasions when prices are set by 
Demand Side Bidders.42  Peaking gas plants are assumed to have an efficiency of 20% (Green and 
Newbery use a band of 18-25%) and their input fuel costs are given by the Gas Oil (CIF for the 
EEC) weekly prices taken from Datastream.  CCGT efficiencies are taken from the OXERA 
database where available, with gaps filled in by taking the average of efficiencies reported for 
plants opening in the same year.  Natural gas prices are the International Petroleum Exchange 
(London) One Month Ahead weekly prices from 1997, and prior to this I use the Natural Gas for 
Electricity Generation quarterly series from Energy Prices and Taxes (IEA).  
 
A1.4 Definition of Variables used in Wolfram IV regression equations 
The basic specification used is: 
Log MarkUp Log Availability Below Log Capacity Bid I
Log Demand unit time dummies
ijt ijt ijt ijt
t ijt
( ) * ( ) * ( ) *
* ( )
+ = + + +
+ + − +
10 1 2 3
4
β β β
β ε  
                                                                                                                                                               
McCloskey (1993).  This figure turned out to be insignificant.  One explanation for this is that, by the late 
1990s, plants more distant from the few remaining UK coalfields were more likely to use imported coal. 
41
 Dual coal/oil plants are treated as coal plants as, using my data, coal production is cheaper than oil 
production.  The environmental reports suggest that it is coal that is mainly used during this period at those 
stations. 
42
 The Demand Side Bidding Scheme was a very limited scheme under which about 30 large customers are 
allowed to bid to reduce their demand based on prices.  From the point of view of setting prices they are 
treated like generators. 
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with interactions included for the first three variables (which are those of primary interest) by 
period and, in a second specification, by owner.  The variable definitions are as follows. 
Mark-Up: the unit’s bid price calculated as above minus the estimated marginal fuel cost, 
calculated from the heat rates and fuel prices (the results reported actually use the Australian coal 
prices).  Following Wolfram I add 10 to the bids in order to reduce the number of observations 
lost due to bids being just below marginal costs.  This primarily affects the very low bids in early 
1995. 
Availability Below: the amount of capacity (MW) a generator owns that has bids below that of 
the unit in question (i.e., the amount of inframarginal capacity).  As high bids will increase the 
unit’s position in the merit order, there is simple mechanical (positive) relationship between a 
high bid and this variable, creating an endogeniety problem.  For this reason an instrument is 
used: Availability Below IV.  Instead of being ordered on its actual bid, units are ordered by all 
their bids on weekdays (weekends) in the quarter.  I then calculate availability below based on 
this measure, and this number forms the instruments.  As unit-quarter-weekday (-end) dummies 
are also included, identification comes simply from variation in the availability of other units 
during weekdays and weekends in the quarter, and not via the availability or bids of the unit 
itself.  As long as the availability of other units is not correlated with the error in the unit in 
question’s bid (possible if availability decisions are made strategically) then the endogeneity 
problem should be overcome.  
Capacity: the maximum capacity declared available by the unit on the day in question.  The unit-
quarter-weekday dummies implies that identification of this variables comes from deviation in 
capacity relative to the quarter-weekday/end average.  
Bid Impact: measured by taking the quarter-weekday (weekend) ranking used to construct the 
instrumental variable and finding the nearest unit above the unit in question which is owned by 
another operator.  If this unit is available on the day Bid Impact is 1, otherwise it is zero.  This 
variable is intending to proxy the degree of competition facing the unit to be included in the merit 
order. 
Net Demand: Total forecast of demand required from centrally dispatched units (Q0) less the 
supply of nuclear plants, interconnectors and independent CCGT.  Using demand alone produces 
similar results.  This variable is included as a control. 
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Unit-quarter-weekday (weekend) dummies: the inclusion of these dummies also limits the 
extent to which mis-measurement of costs should play a role in the results, assuming that costs 
remain fairly similar over a quarter. 
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FIGURE 1: LOAD DURATION CURVES JANUARY – JULY 1997 
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FIGURE 2: Estimated Marginal Fuel Cost Supply Curves for 15 January and 15 
July 1997 and Daily Maximum and Minimum SMPs for January and July 1997 
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FIGURE 3 (a) : 30-Day Moving Average of SMP (£/ MWh) 1995-2000 
 
 
FIGURE 3(b) : 30-Day Moving Average of the Difference between PSP and SMP 
(£/MWh) 1995-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4 (a) SMP Lerner Index 1995 –2000 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4 (b) PSP Lerner Index 1995-2000 
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TABLE 1: CAPACITY SHARES 
(a) Ownership Shares of Capacity % (based on capacity bid, excluding Interconnectors) 
 Jan-Mar  
95 
Apr-Sept 
 95 
Oct 95-
Mar 96 
Apr Sept 
96 
Oct 96  
Mar 97 
AprSept 
97 
Oct 97  
Mar 98 
Apr-Sept 
98 
Oct 98  
Mar 99 
Apr-Sept 
99 
Oct 99  
Mar 00 
AprSept 
00 
NP 40.9 37.0 37.8 31.5 27.0 26.7 29.6 27.7 27.7 24.7 21.3 12.7 
PG 30.2 28.5 29.2 27.6 26.7 25.7 24.2 21.9 22.1 21.8 17.9 18.9 
Eastern 0.7 0.8 0.8 5.7 11.1 9.8 12.1 11.2 10.9 10.4 11.1 8.9 
BE - - - 13.6 11.8 13.7 11.8 13.6 12.5 16.4 11.0 16.4 
BNFL/NE 15.6 19.4 17.3 5.7 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.9 5.5 4.9 3.6 
AES - - - 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.8 4.7 9.0 
EFM 0.4 0.5 2.9 4.8 4.5 4.7 4.6 6.3 4.4 6.3 11.1 10.6 
NGC 4.4 4.4 1.8 - - - - - - - - - 
Other 7.6 9.2 10.8 10.9 11.9 12.7 11.4 13.9 15.7 17.9 17.9 19.9 
(b) Fuel Shares of Capacity Bid % (excluding Interconnectors) 
Coal 55.0 52.1 52.3 49.0 47.9 44.3 47.8 43.9 43.7 39.1 42.0 39.3 
CCGT 13.7 14.9 16.5 19.1 20.1 22.5 21.8 23.9 26.4 29.6 29.9 31.3 
Oil 8.9 6.7 6.7 5.3 5.5 5.2 4.9 4.3 4.1 5.3 4.8 4.2 
Gas 2.4 2.2 2.8 2.9 3.4 3.8 3.4 3.8 3.3 3.7 3.3 3.4 
Nuclear 15.6 19.4 17.4 19.3 18.8 19.9 17.8 19.7 18.5 17.9 15.6 17.0 
Pumped 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.1 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.1 4.4 
 
Comparison with 1990/91: 
Based on output shares, excluding imports,  from Green (1998), Figure 4, pg. 15 
NP: 50%, PG 32%,  Nuclear Electric 16% 
 
  
TABLE 2 : RESULTS OF COURNOT MODEL OF E&W ELECTRICITY MARKET 
 
 Scenario 1: 
1995,  NP and PG 
duopoly, NGC 
owns PS 
Scenario 2: 
1997, Eastern 
Divestiture, 
₤6/MWh premium 
Scenario 3: 
1997, Eastern 
Divestiture, no 
premium 
Scenario 4: 
1999, Eastern, 
EFM, AES 
Divestiture, 
₤6/MWh premium, 
EFM owns pumped 
Scenario 5: 
1999, Eastern, 
EFM, AES 
Divestiture, no 
premium, EFM 
owns pumped 
Scenario 6: 
1999, Eastern, 
EFM, AES 
Divestiture, 
₤6/MWh premium, 
NGC owns pumped 
       
Price (₤/MWh) 48.7 41.6 40.4 33.5 32.5 32.5 
       
Quantities (MWh):       
Independent* 
(assm) 
26100 26870 26870 27900 27900 27900 
NP  8115.4 6330.8 6099.6 4708.9 4542.7 4532.7 
PG  7729.2 6259.7 6034.5 4817.3 4658.5 4648.3 
Eastern  - 4057.2 4803.8 2893.0 3710.3 3036.0 
EFM  - 2085.3 2085.3 4021.4 3893.9 2733.4 
AES  - - - 3290.0 3157.8 3149.38 
NGC 1879.2 - - - - 1879.2 
Oligopoly 17724 18733 19023 19730 19963 19979 
        
Productive 
Inefficiency 
(costs/ideal costs) 
1.003 1.032 1.043 1.020 1.021 1.030 
* independents include EFM, AES and Eastern prior to them becoming coal owners 
 
 
 
  
TABLE 3 : SMP and PSP/SMP ratios 1991-2000 
Period SMP ₤ SMP/PSP SMP Table A ₤  SMP Table B ₤ 
Patrick and Wolak (1997) 
Apr 91-Mar 92 19.52 (4.10) 0.92 (0.11) - - 
Apr 92  Mar 93 22.64 (4.24) 0.94 (0.05) - - 
Apr 93  Mar 94 24.16 (6.71) 0.92 (0.06) - - 
Apr 94  Mar 95 20.78 (12.28) 0.90 (0.12) - - 
Current Sample 
Jan  Mar 95 17.0 (14.2) 0.87 (0.20) 21.0 (16.1) 9.4 (2.3) 
Apr  Sept 95 17.7 (17.8) 0.90 (0.08) 20.2 (19.5) 9.1 (1.2) 
Oct 95  Mar 96 21.1 (12.3) 0.88 (0.17) 24.5 (12.0) 9.5 (1.6) 
Apr  Sept 96 18.3 (9.7) 0.87 (0.16) 20.7 (9.5) 8.9 (0.5) 
Oct 96  Mar 97 22.7 (12.3) 0.91 (0.13) 25.8 (12.2) 11.6 (1.5) 
Apr  Sept 97 19.4 (9.0) 0.99 (0.02) 20.8 (8.9) 10.6 (1.0) 
Oct 97  Mar 98 29.5 (16.8) 0.98 (0.07) 32.9 (16.5) 13.2 (3.7) 
Apr  Sept 98 19.2 (11.0) 0.98 (0.09) 20.9 (11.3) 10.7 (2.8) 
Oct 98  Mar 99 28.0 (18.1) 0.98 (0.06) 31.3 (17.9) 10.3 (2.6) 
Apr  Sept 99 19.1 (8.2) 0.93 (0.16) 21.0 (11.3) 11.2 (1.9) 
Oct 99  Mar 00 21.1 (9.9) 0.97 (0.10) 24.0 (9.8) 12.3 (1.8) 
Apr  Sept 00 18.4 (8.5) 0.88 (0.22) 20.7 (8.4) 10.7 (1.3) 
 
  
TABLE 4(a) : SHARES AND AVERAGE SMP SET BY COAL PLANTS AND PUMPED ST0RAGE PLANTS, BY TABLE PERIOD 1995-2000 
(i) Shares of Price Setting ( %) and Average SMP set by coal plants and Average SMP for pumped storage plants  in Table A periods 
 Jan-Mar 
95 
Apr-Sept 
95 
Oct 95-
Mar 96 
Apr Sept 
96 
Oct 96  
Mar 97 
AprSept 
97 
Oct 97  
Mar 98 
Apr-Sept 
98 
Oct 98  
Mar 99 
Apr-Sept 
99 
Oct 99  
Mar 00 
AprSept 
00 
COAL PLANTS 
NP 85.0% 
16.7 (9.8) 
70.2% 
17.0 (25.2) 
75.9% 
21.6 (9.5) 
59.1% 
18.8 (7.2) 
43.7% 
23.1 (9.3) 
43.7% 
18.3 (5.5) 
46.3% 
29.7 (11.8) 
35.4% 
16.5 (6.1) 
29.2% 
29.0 (15.0) 
44.4% 
20.4 (5.3) 
31.5% 
21.1 (6.3) 
12.5% 
16.3 (4.1) 
PG 15.0% 
33.8 (11.4) 
29.8% 
18.6 (5.8) 
25.0% 
25.5 (11.9) 
34.3% 
17.1 (4.9) 
26.2% 
22.4 (8.6) 
34.6% 
17.9 (5.2) 
28.5% 
29.7 (11.3) 
35.0% 
16.7 (5.1) 
26.1% 
28.1 (13.6) 
28.0% 
22.0 (7.1) 
14.8% 
21.8 (6.6) 
18.3% 
19.7 (5.3) 
Eastern - - - 6.6% 
19.1 (6.9) 
30.0% 
27.1 (12.9) 
21.7% 
25.0 (9.5) 
25.2% 
32.9 (22.4) 
29.6% 
27.5 (16.4) 
44.7% 
31.6 (18.6) 
22.0% 
23.8 (6.1) 
30.2% 
26.9 (9.6) 
17.0% 
25.3 (10.0) 
EFM - - - - - - - - - 5.6% 
19.2 (7.9) 
16.2% 
20.2 (5.5) 
17.0% 
19.5 (5.6) 
AES - - - - - - - - - - 6.7% 
17.4 (4.2) 
23.7% 
17.4 (3.9) 
BE - - - - - - - - - - 0.6% 
18.5 (5.6) 
11.5% 
20.1 (6.4) 
PUMPED STORAGE PLANTS 
NGC 32.7 (10.3) 31.0 (7.8)  35.0 (10.7) -  - - - - - - - - 
EFM - - 33.8 (11.8) 31.3 (10.2) 37.3 (13.8) 33.8 (10.8) 47.2 (17.3) 30.6 (9.3) 43.8 (17.2) 36.5 (10.5) 42.3 (11.5) 34.8 (9.1) 
(ii) Shares of Price Setting ( %) and Average SMP Mark-Ups set by coal plants in Table B periods 
 Jan-Mar 
95 
Apr-Sept 
95 
Oct 95-
Mar 96 
Apr Sept 
96 
Oct 96  
Mar 97 
AprSept 
97 
Oct 97  
Mar 98 
Apr-Sept 
98 
Oct 98  
Mar 99 
Apr-Sept 
99 
Oct 99  
Mar 00 
AprSept 
00 
COAL PLANTS 
NP 70.7% 
8.9 (1.6) 
59.0% 
9.1 (1.0) 
37.8% 
9.2 (0.9) 
66.3% 
9.0 (0.3) 
41.6% 
11.6 (2.0) 
58.9% 
10.8 (0.9) 
74.6% 
13.4 (4.0) 
61.4% 
11.0 (2.5) 
66.1% 
10.3 (2.3) 
57.7% 
11.3 (1.2) 
39.9% 
12.1 (0.6) 
24.9% 
11.1 (0.5) 
PG 29.3% 
9.2 (1.6) 
41.0% 
9.0 (0.9) 
62.2% 
9.4 (1.2) 
33.6% 
9.0 (0.3) 
39.8% 
11.4 (0.8) 
33.4% 
10.8 (0.8) 
16.0% 
12.7 (2.8) 
38.1% 
11.0 (2.4) 
33.0% 
10.0 (1.7) 
32.2% 
11.7 (1.66) 
14.2% 
11.9 (0.7) 
18.1% 
11.3 (0.4) 
Eastern - - - 0.1% 
12.1 (3.7) 
18.6% 
11.8 (0.3) 
7.6% 
11.2 (1.0) 
9.3% 
11.7 (1.9) 
0.5% 
16.0 (0.3) 
0.9% 
16.6 (14.6) 
6.8% 
13.0 (1.0) 
5.6% 
12.5 (0.8) 
2.1% 
11.1 (0.8) 
EFM - - - - - - - - - 3.3% 
12.9 (1.8) 
19.4% 
12.1 (0.8) 
15.4% 
10.4 (0.7) 
AES - - - - - - - - - - 20.8% 
11.6 (0.8) 
39.0% 
11.2 (0.5) 
BE - - - - - - - - - - 0.1% 
11.1 (0.1) 
0.5% 
11.7 (0.5) 
  
 
TABLE 4(b) : SHARES OF THE SMP-SETTING UNIT 1995-2000  
(i) Ownership Shares of Price Setting Unit % (Other category mainly composed of Demand Side Bidders, - if never set price) – ALL FUEL TYPES 
 Jan-Mar  
95 
Apr-Sept 
 95 
Oct 95-
Mar 96 
Apr Sept 
96 
Oct 96  
Mar 97 
AprSept 
97 
Oct 97  
Mar 98 
Apr-Sept 
98 
Oct 98  
Mar 99 
Apr-Sept 
99 
Oct 99  
Mar 00 
AprSept 
00 
NP 62.0 50.4 49.1 45.8 35.5 36.1 42.1 30.5 28.7 33.6 26.8 11.4 
PG 17.5 32.1 33.7 31.5 25.8 34.5 27.6 34.1 27.9 28.2 15.0 18.9 
Eastern 0.0 0.0 - 5.0 23.9 15.4 18.2 20.7 31.5 14.5 19.4 9.7 
BE - - - - - - - - - - 0.0 6.3 
BNFL - - - - - - - - - - - - 
AES - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.4 8.5 23.3 
EFM - - 5.9 16.0 11.1 9.8 11.0 11.6 3.5 7.1 18.8 19.6 
NGC 10.0 16.3 6.6 - - - - - - - - - 
Interc 10.3 0.9 4.6 1.6 3.5 4.0 0.0 2.7 4.6 15.6 11.0 9.6 
Other 0.0 0.0 0.1 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(ii) Fuel Shares of Price Setting Unit% (Other category mainly composed of Demand Side Bidders, - if never set price) -  ALL FUEL TYPES 
Coal 72.9 81.6 81.3 80.5 83.5 85.2 87.6 81.6 87.4 79.0 83.0 78.0 
CCGT 5.9 1.7 0.3 1.8 1.8 1.0 0.3 3.6 - 1.4 0.2 4.4 
Oil 6.0 1.0 1.5 - 0.0 - -  - - - - 
Gas  - - - - - 0 0.4 0.2 1.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 
Nuclear - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Pumped 7.6 14.8 11.8 16.0 11.1 9.8 11.0 11.6 3.5 3.4 5.2 7.6 
Interc 10.3 0.9 4.6 1.6 3.5 4.0 0.0 2.7 4.6 15.6 11.0 9.6 
Other 0.0 0.0 0.1 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Interc=Interconnector 
 
Comparison 1991/92: HHI in price setting was 7,000 (cf. 4,350 in Jan-Mar 1995) (OFGEM, 1999, Figure 14.4). 
 
 
  
 
TABLE 5 : AVERAGE BIDS OF COAL PLANTS AND PUMPED STATIONS 1995-2000 
 Jan-
Mar 95 
Apr-
Sept 95 
Oct 95-
Mar 96 
Apr-
Sept 96 
Oct 96 -
Mar 97 
Apr-
Sept 97 
Oct 97 -
Mar 98 
Apr-
Sept 98 
Oct 98-
Mar 99
Apr-
Sept 99
Oct 99-
Mar 00 
Apr-
Sept 00 
NP stations         
Aberthaw A 34.3 13.9 14.0 8.3 26.3 13.8 26.9 22.5 32.9 26.3 20.9 15.1 
 (39.8) (2.8) (5.7) (3.7) (77.1) (4.2) (7.8) (7.8) (12.5) (10.0) (7.5) (3.8) 
Aberthaw B 8.5 13.7 14.9 14.1 12.1 16.4 27.6 24.1 35.7 32.6 20.7 13.3 
 (9.1) (3.2) (6.5) (3.0) (5.0) (4.0) (7.8) (7.0) (11.0) (10.9) (7.8) (1.8) 
Blyth A 12.5 16.8 18.3 18.7 25.4 25.6 36.6 23.6 43.6 - - - 
 (7.9) (6.0) (6.6) (7.8) (9.5) (8.6) (7.8) (6.9) (11.1) - - - 
Blyth B 9.3 14.5 13.9 15.31 23.2 20.3 30.1 19.6 34.3 68.7 80.1 - 
 (2.4) (17.2) (3.3) (3.3) (7.8) (5.1) (8.1) (6.1) (14.2) (10.40 (8.3) - 
Didcot A 13.8 22.2 23.9 21.7 26.2 12.5 30.5 21.9 33.5 27.0 23.0 14.4 
 (9.1) (6.3) (7.1) (12.5) (30.1) (7.0) (7.3) (7.2) (13.2) (9.7) (6.6) (3.4) 
Tilbury 10.4 15.7 20.6 20.9 27.0 19.2 29.3 16.5 23.8 20.9 22.1 13.0 
 (9.0) (4.4) (6.8) (9.5) (43.9) (6.2) (7.4) (3.1) (12.3) (6.5) (7.1) (1.6) 
Willington B 13.2 16.9 22.3 32.4 28.6 20.8 37.0 20.8 30.4 - - - 
 (9.4) (4.4) (7.1) (29.6) (8.0) (4.1) (6.7) (6.7) (11.0) - - - 
PG stations         
Cottam 4.7 7.9 6.9 12.0 18.3 16.1 21.6 14.7 25.1 20.3 19.5 19.7 
 (0.4) (4.4) (4.3) (6.5) (8.6) (6.0) (9.1) (5.3) (13.1) (7.0) (8.5) (5.8) 
Ince 4.3 5.2 2.5 3.1 0.7 - - - - - - - 
 (0.3) (0.8) (1.2) (1.6) (1.2) - - - - - - - 
Kingsnorth 10.3 20.4 19.1 12.8 20.1 18.4 23.9 16.3 21.0 20.5 19.8 17.9 
 (11.3) (8.2) (9.9) (5.7) (100.9) (4.7) (7.8) (7.4) (11.1) (6.2) (7.0) (4.7) 
Ratcliffe 4.6 8.3 6.9 11.4 18.9 16.8 22.7 14.3 24.5 19.4 19.0 19.0 
 (0.8) (4.7) (4.0) (5.6) (8.9) (6.0) (9.5) (5.6) (12.8) (6.5) (6.4) (5.4) 
NP stations divested to Eastern April 1996  
Ironbridge B 10.3 14.4 19.7 30.0 19.8 15.0 14.3 16.6 21.9 20.3 22.2 22.6 
 (9.6) (2.1) (6.5) (8.8) (11.9) (7.2) (9.0) (8.4) (14.1) (5.6) (5.5) (3.4) 
Rugeley B 7.7 9.2 7.7 18.2 14.6 14.7 8.7 15.2 8.6 15.2 17.9 19.7 
 (7.8) (2.3) (1.4) (10.8) (43.3) (9.0) (9.9) (9.4) (7.1) (5.8) (3.2) (4.4) 
West Burton 4.2 12.5 12.4 11.4 12.3 13.5 10.7 13.8 13.9 17.1 18.6 18.5 
 (2.7) (3.0) (5.6) (9.1) (39.2) (6.2) (9.5) (8.1) (8.8) (4.4) (3.5) (3.9) 
PG stations divested to Eastern April 1996 
Drakelow C 13.6 25.6 23.9 36.9 14.9 14.1 10.9 20.6 13.5 17.2 21.0 14.4 
 (11.9) (6.9) (9.1) (11.6) (11.9) (10.2) (7.7) (12.0) (10.3) (6.8) (7.9) (2.6) 
High Marnham 11.9 27.6 24.6 37.1 15.1 15.1 14.6 15.6 19.6 21.9 25.9 12.7 
 (10.5) (11.8) (10.2) (15.4) (9.2) (9.6) (11.3) (11.6) (12.7) (5.6) (5.5) (1.9) 
PG stations divested to EFM July 1999 
Ferrybridge 4.1 7.5 6.5 12.5 19.6 20.3 19.8 15.4 23.7 19.2 12.6 16.5 
 (1.0) (4.4) (4.9) (12.8) (10.9) (15.1) (7.8) (5.8) (12.2) (8.4) (2.7) (5.3) 
Fiddler's Ferry 4.6 14.5 13.4 9.8 17.3 19.8 24.6 19.1 27.5 19.9 15.5 16.3 
 (3.1) (6.5) (8.9) (4.9) (10.6) (8.8) (9.1) (18.0) (17.6) (8.4) (5.0) (5.3) 
NP station divested to AES November 1999 
Drax 4.0 8.1 7.7 6.2 7.8 10.5 17.1 10.4 16.6 16.2 14.1 13.8 
 (2.7) (1.8) (2.1) (2.3) (2.9) (4.8) (4.6) (4.3) (9.4) (3.9) (2.4) (1.7) 
NP station divested to BE February 2000 
Eggborough 4.1 10.4 7.3 11.5 19.8 18.2 25.7 14.9 28.5 20.0 16.4 16.0 
 (2.6) (24.4) (1.8) (4.4) (6.2) (6.6) (9.5) (4.4) (11.3) (5.6) (4.2) (3.3) 
Pumped stations bought by EFM from NGC December 1995 
Dinorwig 31.1 30.1 32.7 31.1 33.6 34.5 43.4 33.5 43.1 39.7 40.3 42.6 
 (10.0) (10.5) (10.1) (10.9) (11.9) (12.3) (19.9) (11.2) (23.8) (21.3) (17.3) (16.8) 
Ffestiniog 37.4 38.8 41.2 36.8 39.6 43.4 54.2 38.4 55.1 42.5 46.5 47.7 
 (7.6) (12.2) (11.3) (8.9) (8.3) (7.1) (16.4) (9.7) (23.5) (23.3) (20.4) (20.7) 
Definitions: Average bid (₤/MWh) of all units in station on days when some capacity is available.  Standard deviations 
in parentheses.  Double lines mark start of season before divestiture 
  
TABLE 6: RESULTS FROM WOLFRAM (1998)-STYLE STRATEGIC BIDDING REGRESSIONS  
Method: IV using Log(Availability Below IV) as an instrument.  Standard errors corrected with heteroskedasticity across generating units and 
autocorrelation within units.  All regressions contain a set of generating unit-quarter-weekday/-end dummies as well as weekday dummies. Dependent 
variable is Log(Mark-Up+10). Variable definitions in Appendix 1. 
Time Interactions only Time-Owner Interactions 
  (1) Coal units   (2) Coal units 
Log(Availability)  0.198 (0.083)  ** Log(Availability)  0.201 (0.082)** 
Log(Availability)*Time 1  0.115 (0.121) Log(Availability) * Time 1 * NP/PG  0.344 (0.094)***  
Log(Availability)*Time 2  -0.019 (0.077) Log (Availability) * Time 2 * NP/PG  -0.005 (0.080) 
      
Log(Capacity)  -0.417 (0.117) *** Log (Availability) * non-NP/PG  No coal units 
Log(Capacity)*Time 1  0.370 (0.180) ** Log (Availability) * Time 1 * non-NP/PG  -0.188 (0.175) 
Log(Capacity)*Time 2  0.222 (0.140) Log (Availability) * Time 2 * non-NP/PG  -0.036 (0.074) 
      
Bid Impact   -0.002 (0.004) Log (Capacity)  -0.417 (0.117)*** 
Bid Impact * Time 1  0.004 (0.002)     Log (Capacity) * Time 1 * NP/PG  0.204 (0.140) 
Bid Impact * Time 2  0.0009 (0.002) Log (Capacity) * Time 2 * NP/PG  0.145 (0.140)  
      
Log (Net Demand)  0.060 (0.019) *** Log (Capacity) * non-NP/PG  No coal units 
   Log (Capacity) * Time 1 * non-NP/PG  0.825 (0.236) *** 
Constant  0.009 (0.003) *** Log (Capacity) * Time 2 * non-NP/PG  0.309 (0.186) * 
      
# of observations  101,915 Bid Impact  -0.002 (0.004) 
   Bid Impact * Time 1 * NP/PG  0.003 (0.002) 
   Bid Impact * Time 2 * NP/PG  0.002 (0.002) 
   
Bid Impact * non-NP/PG  -0.002 (0.004) 
Bid Impact * Time 1 * non-NP/PG  0.003 (0.002) 
Bid Impact * Time 2 * non-NP/PG  -0.0004 (0.002) 
Log (Net Demand)  0.055 (0.025) ** 
Constant  0.009 (0.002) *** 
   
 
# of observations  101,915 
*** indicates significance at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level 
 
  
TABLE 7: AVAILABILITY (Within Day, (Standard Deviation), Availability in Season) 
Fuel 
(NERC) 
Owner 
(P&W) 
Jan-Mar 95 Apr-Sept 95 Oct 95- 
Mar 96 
Apr-Sept 96 Oct 96 
Mar 97 
Apr-Sept 97 Oct 97 
-Mar 98 
Apr-Sept 98 Oct 98- 
Mar 99 
Apr-Sept 99 Oct 99- 
Mar 00 
Apr-Sept 00 
CCGT 
0.802 
AES 
- 
- - - - - - - 0.9808 
(0.0949) 
0.6596 
0.9998 
(0.0024) 
0.9876 
1.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.9457 
1.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.9938 
0.9929 
(0.0265) 
0.8866 
CCGT 
0.802 
EFM 
- 
0.9920 
(0.0556) 
0.8928 
0.9956 
(0.0420) 
0.9575 
0.9951 
(0.0475) 
0.9516 
0.9968
(0.0413)
0.9042
0.9934
(0.0528)
0.9006
0.9970
(0.0398)
0.9647
0.9964 
(0.0328) 
0.9411 
0.9956 
(0.0439) 
0.8868 
0.9960 
(0.0326) 
0.9684 
0.9979 
(0.0275) 
0.9652 
0.9952 
(0.0404) 
0.9680 
0.9988 
(0.0165) 
0.9606 
CCGT 
0.802 
Eastern 
- 
0.9503 
(0.0632) 
0.8635 
0.9868 
(0.0806) 
0.9090 
0.9590 
(0.0679) 
0.9010 
0.9803
(0.0951)
0.6670
0.9662
(0.0837)
0.7143
0.9699
(0.0515)
0.7019
0.9821 
(0.0502) 
0.9166 
0.9788 
(0.0449) 
0.8673 
0.9644 
(0.0687) 
0.8632 
0.9900 
(0.0780) 
0.6851 
0.9947 
(0.0484) 
0.7887 
0.9731 
(0.0546) 
0.7484 
CCGT 
0.802 
Indep 
- 
0.9518 
(0.1229) 
0.7082 
0.9645 
(0.1063) 
0.7426 
0.9832 
(0.0749) 
0.9408 
0.9925
(0.0423)
0.8702
0.9851
(0.0738)
0.8862
0.9932
(0.0476)
0.8698
0.9930 
(0.0388) 
0.9291 
0.9925 
(0.0549) 
0.7766 
0.9942 
(0.0321) 
0.8486 
0.9931 
(0.0517) 
0.8311 
0.9969 
(0.0223) 
0.9535 
0.9913 
(0.0424) 
0.7933 
CCGT 
0.802 
NP 
- 
0.9841 
(0.0639) 
0.5721 
0.9802 
(0.0768) 
0.9430 
0.9668 
(0.1127) 
0.7346 
0.9512
(0.1421)
0.5960
0.9605
(0.1215)
0.5735
0.9457
(0.1266)
0.6611
0.9652 
(0.1054) 
0.8114 
0.9650 
(0.0872) 
0.7146 
0.9795 
(0.0769) 
0.8631 
0.9750 
(0.0580) 
0.7518 
0.9844 
(0.0503) 
0.8778 
0.9773 
(0.0320) 
0.7377 
CCGT 
0.802 
PG 
- 
0.9924 
(0.0250) 
0.9152 
0.9655 
(0.0971) 
0.7778 
0.9884 
(0.0553) 
0.7592 
0.9612
(0.1216)
0.6867
0.9724
(0.0930)
0.9109
0.9614
(0.0995)
0.8242
0.9789 
(0.0637) 
0.9325 
0.9706 
(0.0823) 
0.6471 
0.9751 
(0.0868) 
0.8038 
0.9534 
(0.1080) 
0.7720 
0.9765 
(0.0805) 
0.8846 
0.9666 
(0.0902) 
0.7512 
Coal 
0.892 
AES 
- 
- - - - - - - - - - 0.9951 
(0.0500) 
0.8231 
0.9812 
(0.1082) 
0.8057 
Coal 
0.892 
EFM 
- 
- - - - - - - - - 0.8779 
(0.1611) 
0.4051 
0.9240 
(0.1631) 
0.7625 
0.9770 
(0.1187) 
0.5756 
Coal 
0.892 
Eastern 
- 
- - - 0.7727
(0.2145)
0.5486
0.8653
(0.2192)
0.7511
0.7616
(0.2351)
0.5198
0.8772 
(0.2111) 
0.8293 
0.6083 
(0.2568) 
0.4609 
0.8530 
(0.2245) 
0.7173 
0.7597 
(0.2019) 
0.5293 
0.9233 
(0.1509) 
0.7731 
0.8439 
(0.1811) 
0.4505 
Coal 
0.892 
BE 
- 
- - - - - - - - - - 0.9880 
(0.0560) 
0.8481 
0.8375 
(0.1516) 
0.5293 
Coal 
0.892 
NP 
0.715 
0.9600 
(0.1444) 
0.9007 
0.9849 
(0.0755) 
0.7796 
0.9901 
(0.0613) 
0.8969 
0.9860
(0.0746)
0.7408
0.9852
(0.0829)
0.8410
0.9854
(0.0759)
0.6927
0.9899 
(0.0738) 
0.9094 
0.9859 
(0.0714) 
0.7535 
0.9900 
(0.0689) 
0.9032 
0.9712 
(0.1229) 
0.6522 
0.9153 
(0.2031) 
0.7491 
0.9633 
(0.1083) 
0.5812 
Coal 
0.892 
PG 
0.700 
0.9130 
(0.1461) 
0.8646 
0.9103 
(0.1410) 
0.7544 
0.9170 
(0.1362) 
0.8695 
0.9415
(0.1198)
0.7399
0.9399
(0.1273)
0.8705
0.9495
(0.1119)
0.7345
0.9554 
(0.1068) 
0.8471 
0.9532 
(0.1115) 
0.6621 
0.9421 
(0.1173) 
0.7737 
0.9481 
(0.1154) 
0.6450 
0.9264 
(0.1207) 
0.7456 
0.9010 
(0.1397) 
0.6291 
Definitions: Within Day = Sum of Actual Actual Availability during Day /(48 Daily Periods *  Maximum Availability).  Seasonal Availability = Sum of Actual Availability for all 
units during season / Sum of (Maximum Availability * 48 Daily Periods * # of days in Season) for all units in season. Standard Deviations in parentheses for Within Day figure.  
Figures in first two columns are NERC availability figures and Patrick and Wolaks estimates for E&W availability in 1995, taken from Patrick and Wolak (1997), Table 4, pg. 58.  
Independent CCGT figure is weighted average of figures reported in Patrick and Wolak.  
 
  
 
TABLE 7 cont. :AVAILABILITY (Within Day, (Standard Deviation), Availability in Season) 
Fuel Owner Jan-Mar 95 Apr-Sept 95 Oct 95- 
Mar 96 
Apr-Sept 96 Oct 96 
Mar 97 
Apr-Sept 97 Oct 97 
-Mar 98 
Apr-Sept 98 Oct 98- 
Mar 99 
Apr-Sept 99 Oct 99- 
Mar 00 
Apr-Sept 00 
Dual 
coal oil 
- 
PG 
- 
0.8745 
(0.1598) 
0.7675 
0.8186 
(0.2195) 
0.5833 
0.8753 
(0.1759) 
0.7677 
0.9859
(0.0633)
0.6463
0.9849
(0.0754)
0.5893
0.9617
(0.0938)
0.8387
0.9863 
(0.0683) 
0.8838 
0.9933 
(0.0441) 
0.8317 
0.9913 
(0.0590) 
0.9282 
0.9903 
(0.0535) 
0.7490 
0.9723 
(0.0840) 
0.7367 
0.9781 
(0.0758) 
0.7561 
Gas 
0.845 
AES 
- 
- - - - 1.0000
(0.0000)
0.9778
1.0000
(0.0000)
0.9398
0.9888 
(0.1039) 
0.9298 
1.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.9503 
0.9994 
(0.0067) 
0.9494 
0.9979 
(0.0274) 
0.9020 
0.9950 
(0.0496) 
0.9713 
0.9876 
(0.0926) 
0.9334 
Gas 
0.845 
EFM 
- 
- - - - - - - - - 0.9981 
(0.0320) 
0.9946 
0.9983 
(0.0273) 
0.9928 
0.9954 
(0.0567) 
0.9736 
Gas 
0.845 
Eastern 
- 
- - - 1.0000
(0.0000)
0.9339
0.9958
(0.0563)
0.9229
0.9968
(0.0348)
0.9682
1.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.9889 
0.9976 
(0.0452) 
0.9797 
0.9709 
(0.1489) 
0.9365 
0.8329 
(0.3545) 
0.7802 
0.9939 
(0.0734) 
0.9441 
0.9979 
(0.0405) 
0.8487 
Gas 
0.845 
Indep 
- 
- 0.9736 
(0.1027) 
0.1572 
0.9804 
(0.0769) 
0.6799 
0.9952
(0.0291)
0.4053
0.9101
(0.1960)
0.8605
0.9997
(0.0038)
0.9495
1.0000 
(0.0003) 
0.8971 
0.9987 
(0.0119) 
0.9162 
0.9948 
(0.0610) 
0.9780 
0.9981 
(0.0256) 
0.9382 
1.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.8880 
0.9990 
(0.0137) 
0.7204 
Gas 
0.845 
NP 
0.534 
0.9902 
(0.0743) 
0.9567 
0.9895 
(0.0789) 
0.9503 
0.9882 
(0.0821) 
0.9673 
0.9910
(0.0733)
0.9141
0.9899
(0.0759)
0.9675
0.9918
(0.0630)
0.9357
0.9876 
(0.0827) 
0.9670 
0.9855 
(0.0891) 
0.9252 
0.9921 
(0.0663) 
0.9382 
0.9911 
(0.0714) 
0.9533 
0.9918 
(0.0632) 
0.9432 
0.9923 
(0.0670) 
0.8148 
Gas 
0.845 
PG 
0.739 
0.9954 
(0.0622) 
0.9726 
0.9948 
(0.0600) 
0.9058 
0.9973 
(0.0404) 
0.9555 
0.9934
(0.0679)
0.9596
0.9922
(0.0666)
0.9316
0.9959
(0.0541)
0.8570
0.9977 
(0.0423) 
0.9856 
0.9992 
(0.0232) 
0.9264 
0.9964 
(0.0483) 
0.9768 
0.9941 
(0.0670) 
0.9026 
0.9966 
(0.0520) 
0.9447 
0.9993 
(0.0199) 
0.9465 
Oil 
0.784 
NP 
0.289 
0.8847 
(0.2206) 
0.8046 
0.9836 
(0.1077) 
0.9180 
0.9921 
(0.0692) 
0.9833 
0.9835
(0.1006)
0.9120
0.9836
(0.0971)
0.5862
0.9855
(0.0947)
0.9544
0.9943 
(0.0531) 
0.9702 
0.9866 
(0.0986) 
0.8337 
0.9964 
(0.0443) 
0.9911 
0.9989 
(0.0150) 
0.9958 
0.9902 
(0.0735) 
0.9530 
0.9724 
(0.1317) 
0.7129 
Oil 
0.784 
PG 
0.292 
0.6856 
(0.1928) 
0.4198 
0.6393 
(0.1288) 
0.3248 
0.7173 
(0.1971) 
0.4256 
0.5696
(0.0629)
0.3164
0.6643
(0.0456)
0.4574
0.6726
(0.0602)
0.3873
0.6867 
(0.0241) 
0.4662 
0.7739 
(0.1850) 
0.5018 
0.8137 
(0.1976) 
0.5816 
0.9735 
(0.0921) 
0.8197 
0.9910 
(0.0464) 
0.9342 
0.9831 
(0.0657) 
0.6671 
Pumped 
- 
NGC 
- 
0.8051 
(0.1604) 
0.7857 
0.8065 
(0.1772) 
0.6934 
- - - - - - - - -  
Pumped 
- 
EFM 
- 
- - 0.7867 
(0.1842) 
0.7537 
0.8000
(0.1763)
0.6863
0.8280
(0.1708)
0.7933
0.7398
(0.1534)
0.6328
0.7929 
(0.1396) 
0.7702 
0.7145 
(0.1345) 
0.6482 
0.6898 
(0.1743) 
0.6734 
0.6833 
(0.1729) 
0.6081 
0.7009 
(0.1964) 
0.6897 
0.7148 
(0.1671) 
0.6343 
  
 
TABLE 8 : WITHIN DAY AVAILABILITY VARIATION FOR COAL PLANTS: INFRAMARGINAL vs. EXTRAMARGINAL 
(Average Availability Within Day, Within Day when Unit is Inframarginal, Within Day when Unit is Extramarginal) 
 
Fuel Owner Jan-Mar 95 Apr-Sept 95 Oct 95- 
Mar 96 
Apr-Sept 96 Oct 96 
Mar 97 
Apr-Sept 97 Oct 97 
-Mar 98 
Apr-Sept 98 Oct 98- 
Mar 99 
Apr-Sept 99 Oct 99- 
Mar 00 
Apr-Sept 00 
Coal AES - - - - - - - - - - 0.9951 
0.996(0.029) 
0.950(0.181) 
0.9812 
0.986(0.074) 
0.910(0.247) 
Coal EFM - - - - - - - - - 0.8779 
0.862(0.297) 
0.826(0.297) 
0.9240 
0.946(0.121) 
0.830(0.315) 
0.9770 
0.984(0.082) 
0.950(0.163) 
Coal Eastern - - - 0.7727
0.784(0.190)
0.786(0.254)
0.8653
0.915(0.141)
0.822(0.251)
0.7616
0.724(0.262)
0.821(0.168)
0.8772 
0.920(0.104) 
0.767(0.288) 
0.6083 
0.696(0.231) 
0.601(0.251) 
0.8530 
0.903(0.164) 
0.748(0.278) 
0.7597 
0.798(0.224) 
0.660(0.279) 
0.9233 
0.940(0.147) 
0.845(0.241) 
0.8439 
0.858(0.165) 
0.716(0.339) 
Coal BE - - - - - - - - - - 0.9880 
0.986(0.060) 
0.964(0.131) 
0.8375 
0.861(0.148) 
0.704(0.356) 
Coal NP 0.9600 
0.980(0.088) 
0.873(0.269) 
0.9849 
0.991(0.054) 
0.937(0.189) 
0.9901 
0.991(0.051) 
0.944(0.185) 
0.9860
0.989(0.058)
0.930(0.206)
0.9852
0.988(0.061)
0.954(0.166)
0.9854
0.983(0.082)
0.948(0.175)
0.9899 
0.992(0.053) 
0.961(0.147) 
0.9859 
0.987(0.062) 
0.951(0.164) 
0.9900 
0.991(0.053) 
0.966(0.141) 
0.9712 
0.976(0.109) 
0.905(0.232) 
0.9153 
0.964(0.137) 
0.806(0.284) 
0.9633 
0.963(0.100) 
0.857(0.278) 
Coal PG 0.9130 
0.947(0.109) 
0.793(0.289) 
0.9103 
0.984(0.061) 
0.760(0.226) 
0.9170 
0.966(0.096) 
0.764(0.201) 
0.9415
0.975(0.089)
0.860(0.200)
0.9399
0.971(0.109)
0.893(0.170)
0.9495
0.973(0.105)
0.887(0.197)
0.9554 
0.981(0.077) 
0.903(0.184) 
0.9532 
0.970(0.098) 
0.883(0.217) 
0.9421 
0.970(0.097) 
0.892(0.183) 
0.9481 
0.956(0.124) 
0.891(0.212) 
0.9264 
0.955(0.110) 
0.860(0.199) 
0.9010 
0.935(0.134) 
0.838(0.209) 
Definition: Within Day = Sum of Actual Actual Availability during Day /(48 Daily Periods *  Maximum Availability).  Infra-marginal = Sum of Actual Actual Availability during 
Day when Bid Makes Unit Infra-marginal/(# of Periods when Unit is Inframarginal *  Maximum Availability). Extra-marginal defined similarly for hours when unit is made extra-
marginal by its bid. Standard Deviations in parentheses. 
 
TABLE 9 : NUMBER OF SPELLS WITH UNITS NOT AVAILABLE FOR MORE THAN SEVEN DAYS 
Fuel Owner Jan-Mar 95 Apr-Sept 95 Oct 95- 
Mar 96 
Apr-Sept 96 Oct 96 
Mar 97 
Apr-Sept 97 Oct 97 
-Mar 98 
Apr-Sept 98 Oct 98- 
Mar 99 
Apr-Sept 99 Oct 99- 
Mar 00 
Apr-Sept 00 
Coal AES - - - - - - - - - - 1 2 
Coal EFM - - - - - - - - -- 5 5 10 
Coal Eastern - - - 5 5 14 4 11 7 15 12 11 
Coal BE - - - - - - - -- - - 0 3 
Coal NP 5 36 12 27 13 21 8 21 9 25 6 12 
Coal PG 3 2 10 15 4 15 4 13 8 9 8 7 
TOTAL  8 38 22 47 21 40 16 43 24 54 26 45 
 
  
TABLE 10 : PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY FOR COAL PLANTS 
 
 Jan-Mar 
95 
Apr-Sept 
95 
Oct 95-
Mar 96 
Apr-Sept 
96 
Oct 96 -
Mar 97 
Apr-Sept 
97 
Oct 97 -
Mar 98 
Apr-Sept 
98 
Oct 98-
Mar 99 
Apr-Sept 
99 
Oct 99-
Mar 00 
Apr-Sept
00 
System  
Efficiency 
1.013 1.016 1.014 1.021 1.024 1.026 1.025 1.028 1.031 1.026 1.024 1.029 
Efficiency=(Actual cost)/(Ideal costs) based on efficient running of plants that are available at the point of time in question.  Double lines represent the timing of the first 
divestiture of coal plants and the start of the second period of divestiture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
